

## 1. Introduction

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The accelerated process of globalization has brought interconnectedness to geographically diverse locations. Today, our day-to-day experiences are shaped by the transnational flow of capital, commodities, images and people from different places around the world. The literature on globalization reveals a plethora of views and categories for understanding the complex processes of global restructuring . First, globalization was understood as being equal to ‘Americanization,’ that is, that commodities of US origin such as ‘McDonald’s’, ‘Mickey Mouse’ or ‘Microsoft’ homogenize different local cultures. America is considered as the dominant model for universalization, unilaterally penetrating various regions of the globe. The second perspective emphasizes not the homogeneity, but rather the mixture of differences, and ascribes to a dialectic process between the local and the global. Under this model, the convergence of different cultures does not result in total domination of one culture over the other, but rather is underpinned by hybridization or creolization through appropriation and adaptation (Tomlinson, 1991; Clifford, 1988; Hannerz, 1996).

Within the East Asian context , global restructuring is a simultaneous process with similar overall structural changes, but with different responses each embedded in its local socio-economic and cultural practices . Korea, Taiwan, Province of China and Japan are encountering a similar change in population demography: the low fertility rate and aging society which has explicit or implicit implications to the recent transnational flow of migration from Southeast Asia to supplement the shortage of workers . This phenomenon is particularly salient in the field of reproductive labor where the ‘importing’ of the body of the Southeast Asian

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The term ‘global restructuring’ is used to explain that which “explicitly refers to a process of (partially) breaking down an old order and attempting to construct a new one” (Marchand 1996: 577) quoted in (Marchand and Runyan, 2000: 7).

<sup>2</sup> The term ‘East Asia’ mainly refers to Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province of China which are the three countries discussed in this research report. According to the United Nations, Taiwan, Province of China is considered as a ‘region’ but in this report, instead of writing ‘two countries and one region’ the term ‘three countries’ is used.

women either in the form of international marriage and/or care workers is taking place . Intra - regional migration in Asia has increased since the 1970 s, and East Asia is emerging as a migration market for Southeast Asians through two dynamics < feminization of migration> and <globalization of reproductive work where the care work has increasingly becoming shouldered by migrant women . The unprecedented level of aging that is taking place in East Asia and the economic disparities between the Southeast Asian countries mediate the flow of migrant women from the Philippines , Indonesia and Vietnam to take up the reproductive work , whether paid or unpaid . This international division of reproductive labor intersects with class, ethnicity , and gender , and tends to reproduce various forms of unequal relationships in different contexts . The emerging form of globalization of reproductive work is governed by the policy , institutions and discourses that define reproductive work primarily as a female domain , which is trivial to the formal economic activities mainly undertaken by men.

There is an extensive body of scholarship examining gender and migration as well as globalization of care work through multiple approaches: within different temporalities ranging from historical to more contemporary forms of migration, and within different analytical frameworks ranging from macro social systems to meso-level social institutions to micro-level caregiving practices (Choy, 2003; Ehrenreich et al. 2002; Parrenas, 2003; Sassen, 2002; Aguilar, 2002; Constable, 2007). One of the driving forces in shaping the literature is the feminist scholarship in contributing to our understanding of the globalization of reproductive labor. Reproductive labor can be defined as:

(Labor) which creates and sustains human life (beings) as distinct from commodities and products (things). This reproductive labour can be divided into that which is necessary for the biological reproduction of human beings (sexual labour for procreation), the maintenance of individuals throughout their life cycle (looking out for and looking after others) and systemic reproduction (education, social bonds, social values) enabling the social system to be sustained (Yeates, 2009:5).

The concept of ‘reproductive labor’<sup>3</sup> allows one to encapsulate the otherwise divided categories that exist among foreign women: on the one hand, there are migrant workers and foreign brides, and on the other hand there are care workers and sex workers. These different dichotomies work as powerful frames, imposing particular stereotypes upon migrant women and shaping the subjectivity of the women according to these labels. As Piper and Roces (2003:1-2) rightly pointed out, the dominance of

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<sup>3</sup> Although the terms ‘reproductive work’ and ‘care work’ are not the same, they are used in an interchangeable manner in this report.

economics in migration theory has resulted in looking at women either as overseas contract workers or as marriage migrants. The gender-sensitive scholarship in migration has shed light on the shifting roles of women, in which women negotiate their roles and identities trying to transform the existing categories as domestic helpers, caregivers, sex workers or wives. However, in many cases, migrant women are negotiating within the sphere of reproductive work, which has been pre-defined and constructed within the gendered nature of the host country.

Zimmerman et al. (2006) identifies four crises of care to theoretically locate the globalization of care work. First, the care deficit which involves a lack of paid (or affordable) care, as well as a lack of informal care. Second, the commodification of care that refers to re-organization of carework into services and products which can be purchased in the market. Third, the impact of supranational organizations such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and finally, the deepening of global stratification on the basis of race and class. Within the East Asian context, the four crises of care has been taking place in different manifestations but the research especially with a comparative perspective has started only recently. This research is an exploratory study to empirically address and compare the nation-specific patterns with regard to the crises of care within the East Asian context, and to discuss whether it propels the historical patterns of ethnic, class and gender discrimination at the global scale.

The three countries in East Asia described herein (Japan, Korea and Taiwan, Province of China) not only represent significant similarities in demographic changes, but also share a common trend in several aspects. First, compared to the West where there is a long history in accepting migrants from around the world, the three countries have less experience in receiving and integrating migrants. Among the three, Japan has the longest experience in accepting migrants from its former colonies. By the end of World War II, 30% of the Japanese population were not ethnic Japanese but were considered to be Japanese due to colonization of such territories as Taiwan, Province of China and Korea. (Oguma, 1995). When the war came to an end, more than one million non-ethnic Japanese left and went back to their home countries, but some decided to remain due to various reasons. Thereafter, the integration of the old comer migrants was undertaken without much substantial progress. Moreover, Japan used to send emigrants abroad until the 1950s. It was only in the late 1980s with the expansion of the bubble economy that Japan turned itself into immigrant receiving country<sup>4</sup>. Korea and Taiwan, Province of China also started to accept migrants on a larger scale since the 1990s.

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<sup>4</sup> The term 'immigrant' or 'migrant' which has a connotation of permanent settlement is not used in Japan. Rather, the term 'foreigner' (外国人) is used in policy documents, media and academic writings.

Second, with regard to the first point, the discussion of human rights and citizenship of migrants has only started to take place in these three countries. Both Japan and Korea<sup>5</sup> have ratified certain international conventions such as the UN Convention on Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Child Rights, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (also referred to as the Trafficking Protocol)<sup>6</sup> etc., but the enforcement of such laws still remains insufficient, allowing manipulation to take place in the labor market. In the sending countries, the welfare provision for overseas migrant workers is also limited due to inadequate funding, which leads to the vulnerability of the migrant workers. What should be noted for the purpose of this research is that this vulnerability is clearly gender-based. The data from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) in the Philippines reveals that in 1994, OWWA and related government ministries handled 14,314 reported cases involving migrants. The cases involving women far exceeded men: 94.5% of health and death cases, 80.6% of crime and cultural offences, 78.9% of contract payment cases, and 78.5% of welfare cases were those of women<sup>7</sup>. The lack of human rights protection may be exaggerated by the low Gender Empowerment Measures (GEM) (See Table 1) in the host countries which allows gender inequality to be prevalent and, doubly marginalizes the foreign women as both ‘migrants’ and ‘women.’

Third, compared to Southeast Asia, where one will find hundred of different languages and ethnic groups, the ways in which the nation has been imagined in these three destination countries remain relatively homogeneous. Japan and Korea has been basically mono-lingual with a small number of ethnic minorities, while the situation in Taiwan, Province of China is more complex. Japan has also been known for its strong racialised discourse in believing the purity and uniqueness of its nation and the celebration of ‘Japaneseness’ is manifested in literature, language and cultural practices. This, combined with the discrimination toward the “others” in everyday lives, tends to further marginalize the migrants instead of integrating them into the larger society (Tanaka, 1991; Go and Jung, 1999; Lee, 2009). Discussions about multi-culturalism have only just started in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, Province of China and the concept (as well as the practice) still has to be examined and developed<sup>8</sup>(See

<sup>5</sup> Taiwan, Province of China is not a member of the UN, so it does not have the status to ratify the UN conventions. However, the government in Taiwan, Province of China has formally endorsed these conventions in 2009 in an effort to enter the world stage.

<sup>6</sup> However, both Japan and Korea has not ratified UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families.

<sup>7</sup> Gonzales, 1998:90 cited in Ball and Piper, 2006:224.

<sup>8</sup> In Japan, the term ‘multi-cultural co-existence’ (多文化共生) has become widespread after the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995 when the support centers for foreign residents were established. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has published a report which states the policy guidelines (Ogawa, 2009). In Korea, the rapid increase of marriage migrants lead to the establishment of Multi-Cultural Family Support Law (多文化家族支援法) in 2008.

Chapters 4 and 5).

Fourth, all three countries are in the process of transformation of care work to go to the market. Due to the expansion of the aging population and decreasing capacity of the family, the traditional approach in undertaking care as unpaid work seems neither possible nor plausible. The boundary between paid and unpaid work has been redefined through the implementation of new social policies and immigration policy that lead to the commodification of care. In particular, the shift in family ideology took place in Japan after the introduction of Long Term Care Insurance (LTCI) in 2000 where the care work became 'socialized' both in terms of workforce and payment. In Korea, the LTCI was introduced in 2008, and Taiwan, Province of China is now going through a heated debate about its scheduled implementation in 2011<sup>9</sup>. This redrawing of the boundaries between the 'public' and 'private,' 'paid' and 'unpaid' work has inevitably affected the ways in which 'reproductive work' has been conceptualized. In the case of Taiwan, Province of China the commodification of care took place within the confines of the ideology of the three-generation family, so when increasing number of Taiwanese women went into the labor market, migrant caregivers were introduced and expected to fill in the reproductive work in the private sphere as cheap and flexible labor (See Chapter 3).

Finally, family ideology remains strongly embedded in the socio-cultural discourse of the three countries. When an increasing number of educated women in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, Province of China started to refuse the idea of domesticity, women from low income countries were brought in to formulate and ensure the continuity of the family system. The women who cross borders and enter into a new family as brides are expected to engage in unpaid reproductive work within the sphere of intimacy (See Chapters 4 and 5).

Table 1 shows the comparison of different indicators between the sending and receiving countries. Striking similarities can be found among the receiving countries with high GDP, Human Development Index and life expectancy accompanied by a low total fertility rate compared to those of the sending countries. Even though the foreign population rate remains low, the high proportion of females among the migrants coincides with the overall trend of 'feminization of migration'.

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9 The LTCI policy in Taiwan, Province of China is still uncertain. The government in Taiwan, Province of China established a taskforce on LTCI in August 2009, in charge of its planning, and announced 2011 to be the date for its implementation in order to fulfill President Ma's election promises. Yet, the Prime Minister, Wu Dun-Yi, claimed in his interview that due to the controversies regarding the LTCI, the date of implementation has been postponed.

Table 1: Comparison between the sending and receiving countries

	Japan	Korea	Taiwan , Province of China	Philippines	Indonesia
GDP Per Capita (US\$)	38,457	19,136	16,987	1,845	2,238
Total Fertility Rate (TFR)	1.37	1.21	1.14	3.1	2.2
Life Expectancy at Birth	82.7	79.2	78.57	71.6	70.5
Human Development Index(HDI)Rank	10	26	25	105	111
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)	57	61	24*	59	96
Stock of Immigrants	2,152,000	1,160,000	Total:760,454 345,755 (worker) & 414,699 (marriage migrants)	374,800	135,000
Proportion of Female Immigrants	54.0%	51.4%	63% (worker) 92.6% (marriage migrants)	50.1%	46.0%
Foreign Population Rate	1.74%	2.34%	1.3%	0.4%	0.1%
International Marriage Rate	5.5%	11%	23.4%	-	-
Occupation and Numbers of Migrant Women in Reproductive Work	(ex) entertainers approx. 200,000, marriage migrants approx. 30,000, nurse and caregiver (candidates) max. 2,000	marriage migrants 144,000	caretakers 168,427 marriage migrants 414,699	-	-

sources: IMF, 2009; UNDP, 2009; World Bank, 2009; Ministry of Justice, Japan; Ministry of Health, Welfare and Labor Japan (2009); Department of Statistics, Ministry of the Interiors, Taiwan, Province of China (2009)

\* Although Taiwan, Province of China is not a member of UN, Bureau of Statistics has used the same function to conduct the GEM.

<http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/Attachment/771314585171.pdf>

According to Lim and Onishi (1996) the reason why the “feminization of

migration” is most pronounced in Asia is due to the relative ‘flexibility’ of Asian women to work abroad both for men from their own countries and for female migrants from other parts of the world. The reasons attributed to this ‘flexibility’ are identified as: the relative lack of social constraints in allowing young, unmarried women to work abroad, the relatively high female labor force participation rates in their own countries, the active role of the governments and private sectors in promoting migration, and social networks already existing in the host country. These factors have contributed to the large scale emigration of women from Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, the government has institutionalized migration as part of their export industry, establishing mechanisms to send workers overseas since the 1970s (Parrenas, 2003). Indonesia is increasingly following this path, especially in the aftermath of the financial crises in 1997 (Hugo, 2000).

Although we can identify certain historical and structural similarities, each country is unique in its own right, and migration flow has been produced under the specific conditions of each country. Sassen (2007:130) argues the necessity to go beyond the traditional approach of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in explaining migration. Teconomic analysis tend to focus on the fact that poverty and unemployment are the dominant push factors, and the future prospects for better payment contributes to the pull factors guiding migration. However, if this is the case, it should lead to massive out-migration of both males and female, which is not taking place. Rather, she emphasizes the additional variables that are clearly at work. For example, most migrations have been initiated by recruitment processes through co-operations, governments, or brokers, and without these actors, migration has not taken place. These actors change according to different contexts, but considering the scale of the migratory flow of Southeast Asian women to East Asia, it is not possible to understand it as an accumulation of individual decisions. In other words, one might decide to migrate as a personal decision, but this migration itself is socially produced through a systemic policy and established institutions (Sassen, *ibid*:131). The research aims to focus on the macro and meso level analysis of the migratory flow of women from Southeast Asia to East Asia undertaking reproductive work. In particular, it aims to compare the policy, institutions and public discourses in Korea, Taiwan, Province of China and Japan, as well as the social support systems for migrant women, and to problematize how these societies deal with reproductive labor under the rapid demographic transformation.

The scope of this research includes both the migration of care workers (Japan, Korea and Taiwan, Province of China) and international marriages (Taiwan, Province

of China and Korea), focusing on the migratory flow of Southeast Asian women to East Asia. There are several reasons for combining these two categories. First, when we see migration as a *process*, the analytical scope may be too limited and mechanical if we categorize a person only at the point of entry. The migrant woman's experience manifests multiple roles that she undertakes, and the fact that these roles are also subject to change over time. Although this research has more emphasis on the policy side, it is important to see the women as an agency exerting individual autonomy and developing various strategies of coping and resisting unfavorable conditions. Numerous cases can be found in the actual movements of people, such as the transition of a migrant woman from a rural area in Southeast Asia who come to Japan as an entertainer, subsequently get married to a Japanese man, and is now working as a caregiver. Similarly, a woman who came to Japan as a foreign bride may get divorced, and start working in Taiwan, Province of China as a caregiver. Thus, women are shifting between different categories, negotiating their self and identities within the transnational care space which is emerging in East Asia.

Second, although the foreign brides are entering the space of intimacy, the distinction between the migrant worker and marriage migrant become blurred in a number of ways. When we consider international marriage between countries which have economic inequalities, the brides are often not free from the responsibility of taking care of their family back in their home country. So the remittance continues, just like in the case of migrant workers. Also, when the married couple has big age gaps, she is often expected to take care of her husband and parents-in-law at home as an unpaid care worker. The distinction between the paid and unpaid carework are not dichotomous, and the line between them has become blurred (Zimmerman, 2006).

Third, by combining the migration of care workers and international marriages, it allows us to see the new configuration of care regimes in the three countries. Until very recently, the care work has been confined within the framework of the nation-state. For example, in Japan, the mainstream scholarship on social welfare and social policy hardly paid attention to the issue of migrant women and men, while the migration studies are largely focusing on the legal status and human rights of old and new-comer migrants in production work. It was only after the entry of Southeast Asian nurses and caregivers under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that these two disciplines started to converge, opening up a new field of inquiry. Likewise, the global circulation of people within East Asia challenges the methodological nationalism so that it is no longer possible to conceptualize our research within one country. The interrogation into the new restructuring of care regimes in each countries reveals not only the embodiment of racialised and gendered character of our society, but also the different state



involvement (or the lack thereof) in shaping the care provisions.

The following chapters are meant to foster dialogue between various processes of global restructuring by using gender and migration as an analytical tool. Each chapter aims to address at least one of the following research questions:

- (1) What are the policies and institutions that shape the immigration of Southeast Asian women to East Asia? What does it imply, and what are the limitations?
- (2) What kind of public discourse has been constructed, and why does it look plausible? What kind of anxieties does it represent with regard to the globalization?
- (3) What are the long-term prospects for incorporation of the Southeast Asian women into the larger society?

Chapter 2 deals with the globalization of reproductive work in Japan by juxtaposing the two migration streams engaged in care work which took place over the period of 30 years. It compares the actors and networks within the global care chain and discusses the cost and risk for migration. The first stream is represented by the infamous importing of entertainers, which was accelerated since the late 1970s. The state welcomed and endorsed the entry of large number of migrant women to fulfill the sexual desire and economic interest of certain groups, including the organized crime syndicates. After twenty years, these migrant women became wives and mothers of Japanese nationals and are increasingly turning to the work of caregiving.

The second stream started from 2008 upon the establishment of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Japan and Southeast Asian countries, which includes the migration of nurse and caregiver candidates in its provisions. Unlike the first stream, the state is actively involved in the recruitment, matching, training and deployment of the migrant care workers. The two migratory regimes represent a sharp contrast in how the risk and the cost of migration have been distributed between the different actors, and question the role of the state in shaping the care provisions. The migration of care workers reflects the global inequalities, and reveals how the care work has been situated within the society. The transfer of reproductive labor can be seen as a form of ‘social dumping’ of unwanted work from the women in the developed countries to the women in the poorer countries. Japan is now at a critical point in defining the ways in which it can incorporate the migrants into the care regime, as well as within the society at large.

Chapter 3 discusses the changing formation of the care market in Taiwan, Province of China by contrasting two prevailing images of women, that of the undutiful daughter and the cold-blooded migrant killer, and reveals the way in which the migrant care workers have become incorporated at the bottom of the care market as a consequence of social policies. Under the Confucian tradition, care for the

elderly has long been defined as the responsibility of women in Chinese family ethics. By allocating 'care' in the private sphere, the state minimizes its role in the provision of elder care, which has paved the way for care to go to the market. Since 1992, the importation of migrant household workers became a source of cheap and affordable care due to the retrenchment of the state expenditure in establishing adequate care provisions. However, the entitlement of migrant care workers is extremely restricted, as they are excluded from the protection of labor standard law.

The dominant image of migrant care workers portrayed in the media is that of 'cold-blooded killers' which has been largely shaped by the voices of experts or police that will reproduce discourses to corroborate public opinion. The employers are constantly in fear of migrants running away, which not only divide the Taiwanese, women and migrant women, but also assign the Taiwanese women the task of policing these migrant workers. However, both the employers and the migrants are locked in a vicious cycle that is created by the state policy. What has to be revealed and examined is the state policy and broker system, which categorizes migrant workers as the 'others,' and turns the structural oppression into interpersonal conflicts.

Chapter 4 aims to situate migrant women who are engaging in reproductive/care work in Korea by focusing on the immigration policy. It analyzes how the relationship between migration of women and the reproductive/care deficit in Korea has been intertwined by examining both the paid and unpaid reproductive/care work provided by migrant women. As a result of the aging population and the low fertility rate, the reproductive/care crises has been an important focus of public discussion since 2000, which created an environment to allow the import of migrant women. Applying the Korean government's immigration policies to female migrants, Korean-Chinese women and marriage migrants are at the center of performing reproductive/care work.

The influx of Korean-Chinese women took place after the introduction of <Employment Management System for Koreans with Foreign Passports> in 2002 which allowed Koreans with foreign passports to work in the service sector. By 2009, Korean-Chinese women made up 90% of the live-in domestic helpers, an occupation which the other nationals temporary residing in Korea is not allowed to undertake. The Korean-Chinese women are considered to be 'aunts' and 'grandmothers', and are treated as members of the family rather than workers in Korean households, however, their expression of work is "we serve and sacrifice ourselves in doing this dirty work." Although the Korean-Chinese women exert their own agency in gaining a better position in society, their confinement as reproductive/care workers excludes them from the health, safety, medical insurance and legal protection.

Aside from the Korean-Chinese women engaged in paid care work, the entry of marriage migrants in Korea began in the 1990s and has accelerated since 2000 due to the decline of agricultural communities after the forcible opening of the Korean market under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. Instead of providing measures to strengthen the rural economy, the government started to solve the depopulation crises by importing marriage migrants. The matchmaking agencies mushroomed by importing Korean-Chinese women, and it did not take long to expand their geographical coverage to include countries such as Cambodia, Mongolia and Uzbekistan. Responding to the social issues created by the influx of marriage migrants and their offsprings, interactions among government, civil society and academic researchers took place, which eventually resulted in the formulation of the multicultural family policy in 2008. However, the multicultural policy aiming for 'integration' has an orientation towards assimilation of marriage migrants into the patriarchal Korean family order, and conceals their potential to become independent citizens negotiating their own rights.

Chapter 5 is based on the researcher's reflections on social work services toward the marriage migrants in Taiwan, Province of China, both from mainland China and Southeast Asia. International marriage in Taiwan, Province of China increased in the late 1980s and peaked in 2003, where 31.86% of the marriages were between Taiwanese and people from mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Southeast Asia. The growing number of international marriages is intertwined with the globalization of the capital in Taiwan, Province of China within this region. The increase in business travel was also accelerated by the "Go-South Policy" of the Taiwan, Province of China to decrease risks and overdependence on the Mainland Chinese market. Under this political-economic development between Taiwan, Province of China and less developed Southeast Asian countries, emigration of foreign brides from Southeast Asia to Taiwan, Province of China started to increase.

By the late 1990s to early 2000, various support systems for marriage migrants were institutionalized both by the government and the civil society. However, the government-run system has been hotly debated, especially with regard to the cases of marriage migrants' accessing social services. The chapter argues that, although the government-run county centers became the nexus for marriage migrants to have access to various resources and information, they are also sites of control for the state to exert its power over the bodies of marriage migrants who are not acknowledged as full members of the society. Thus, the identity and subjectivity of social workers become contested between the 'state body' and 'helping body' influenced by the state and county regulations.

The Conclusion discusses several points which surfaced during the research that

might be useful for future inquiry. First, the ways in which care workers are introduced sharply differs between Taiwan, Province of China and Japan in defining the role of the state and the market. Migration of care workers in Taiwan, Province of China has been dominated by the market through private brokers maximizing the economic benefit, while the Japanese case is state dominated shouldering the heavy cost under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). Korea serves as an interesting case as it utilizes the labor reserve of diaspora community, namely Korean-Chinese women to undertake care work through special visa arrangements. Further research is required to identify the role of the state and the market in shaping the care provisions. Second, there is a question of distribution of care resources under the global care deficit. The issue of 'brain drain' has long been discussed in the migration literature and we need to look into the consequence of extracting care resources from the poorer countries. One of the potential solutions to the unequal distribution of care is to look into the gender order in the receiving societies as we need to ensure the fair distribution of care in terms of race, class and gender both at the local and the global level. Third, in Taiwan, Province of China and Korea, the marriage migrants are at the center of the immigration policy which is increasingly geared towards 'integration'. However, we need to be cautious about the discourse of 'multiculturalism' as it may orient the marriage migrants towards 'assimilation' and 'docility' instead of opening up spaces for empowerment as citizens and as full members of the society.

The research presented has been jointly conducted with Eun-shil Kim, Ewha Womans University; Frank Tsen-Yung Wang, National Yang Ming University; Hsiao Chun Liu, National Taiwan, Province of China Normal University; and Reiko Ogawa, Kyushu University. The dialogue and discussion which were fostered during our research revolved around the issue of care, globalization, migration and gender, repeatedly questioning the unequal distribution of care under the global capitalism, and the need for transforming our society to be more humane and fair to both the locals and the migrants.

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## **2. Globalization of Reproductive Work in Japan: From Entertainers to Care Workers**

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### **(1) Introduction**

Feminization of migration in the international labor market has been one of the trends that underpin the intra-regional migration in Asia. The migration of Asian women is characterized by its concentration in traditionally feminized jobs, such as domestic helpers, caregivers, and entertainers. These jobs are usually less well-paid and are frequently situated at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, which is generally shunned by the local women. These occupational differences in which the migrant women are allowed to enter reveal the socio-cultural processes in each country that account for different migration patterns. The occupational distribution of migrant women in Asia reflects the gender selectivity in the host society in shaping the migration stream, i.e. domestic helpers in Singapore and Hong Kong, caregivers in Singapore and Taiwan, Province of China, and entertainers in Japan (Constable, 2007, Cheng, 2006, Ng, 2005). The occupations that migrant women can enter reflect nation-specific patterns in how reproductive work has been situated within a particular society.

This paper aims to juxtapose the two migration streams of Southeast Asian women to enter into Japan: entertainers from the late 1970s and care workers under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) from 2008. It will contextualize the two migratory flows within the historical trajectory between Japan and the Philippines and examine how state intervention (or non-intervention) and discourses have been shaped and contested.

The perspective of the ‘global care chain’ (GCC) has motivated our query into the structural relationship between the two migratory flows which span three decades. The GCC refers to ‘a series of personal links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring’ (Hochschild, 2000:131). GCC was derived from the global commodity chain analysis, which focuses on the transnational process of production and the distribution of surplus and profits at different ‘nodes’ within the structure. It is also influenced by the world system theory, which takes a macro and historical perspective on the global expansion of the capitalist economy (Wallerstein,

1979, 1984). Based on the economic theory that focuses less on national economy and more on the interconnecting mechanisms of production and distribution, GCC emphasizes on the interconnection between the different women who are linked to the chain through care work.

For example, when a Filipina mother from Manila takes a position as a nanny in the USA, she must leave her children behind who have to be taken care of by a poorer woman from the surrounding rural area. Subsequently, the woman migrating from the rural area to take care of the middle class children in Manila has to leave her children behind who can only be taken care of by the eldest daughter. The care chain links the households (and women) in the South and the North through unequal values and emotions ascribed to care work. According to Hochschild (ibid), the children in the North will receive the ‘emotional surplus value’ because the migrant mother will add more emotions to the children she babysits in the North to compensate the emptiness of leaving her own children behind while at the bottom of the care chain there will be a care deficit.

By extending the concept of the GCC, Yeates (2009) argues that the global care chain concept is a useful framework in analyzing the transnational care mobilities in several ways. First, it focuses on actors and networks within the chain. Secondly, it allows us to see the distribution of risks, costs, and profits along the chain. Thirdly, it accounts for not only the inequalities in labor but also the inequalities of emotion, and suggests the need for comparative analysis of GCCs in different contexts. Using Yeates framework, this paper examines the first and second aspects of GCC in providing a comparative analysis of different actors and the distribution of costs and risks in shaping migration. In particular, this preliminary case study attempts to illustrate the role of the state and the market in shaping the care provision as well as the migration policy that allows the influx of Southeast Asian women to undertake reproductive work in Japan.

## **(2) Migration of women as entertainers**

In contrast to other developed countries, migrant women in Japan do not enter occupations in the lower end of the service economy but are allowed only to work predominantly as entertainers<sup>1</sup>. Douglass (2000:91) points out that “migration streams are reflections of both structural conditions in the world economy and micro-economic

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<sup>1</sup> “Entertainment” has been defined under the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (1990) as “to show film, theater, music, sports and performance to the public” which include occupations such as acting, dancing, singing, professional football, fashion modeling, directing, choreography, photography, recording technician, campaign girls, etc. (Kokusai Jinryu, 1991:13-4)



decisions of would-be migrants, [and] it is equally important to understand that migration is also a function of the ways in which different societies construct gender roles that divide movers from stayers and determine which occupations female and male migrants are most likely to enter.” He further notes that Japan is the only country in the world that recruits women for a single purpose: sexual services.

This view to see entertainers as prostitutes are so prevalent that the term ‘japayuki’ became highly stigmatized. In fact, it is not accurate to consider all those who worked in Japan as entertainers to be engaged in prostitution because many are neither engaged in striptease nor prostitution but are singing, dancing, and drinking with their customers in bars and night clubs. According to the research of Ministry of Justice, from 1987 to 1990, among 87% of the Filipinas who were arrested as working beyond their visa category were working as entertainers. Among them, 3.4% were performing striptease shows and 2.8% were forced into prostitution<sup>2</sup>. Another research study suggests that among 50 Filipina informants who used to work as entertainers, only one performed in striptease shows<sup>3</sup>. These findings resonate with my interview with an ex-entertainer. Christine came to Japan in the 1987 and is now married to a Japanese man and lives with her in-laws. She says, ‘I have done nothing wrong, so why do I need to hide that I worked as an entertainer?’<sup>4</sup> This does not neglect the fact that the abuse of this visa category has been ongoing since the 1980s, and the fate of the migrant women purely depends on ‘luck’.

Christine, who recently turned to caregiving in a nursing home, laments the fact that one of the reasons that the Filipinas cannot exit from the entertainment business is because of the stereotype that exists in Japanese society to perceive them as engaged in ‘prostitution’. This stigma continues to haunt the migrants and prevents them from reaching their full potential even after several decades. What is lacking in the negative portrayal of the migrant women is the racialised and sexualized demand in the Japanese society, which is accelerated by the immigration policy and puts these women in a vulnerable position, obscuring the line between entertainers and prostitutes. In order to understand the construct of migrant women as ‘entertainers’, the historical trajectory of the entertainer visa, its relation to Filipinos and how the Japanese society situates them in the larger discourse will be examined in the next section.

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2 Anderson, J.N. (1999), *Filipina Migrants to Japan: Entertainers, housekeepers, and homemakers*, Kokusai gakubu fuzoku kenkyu nenpo, 2, 129-152, cited in Takeda, 2005:83-4.

3 Suzuki, N. (2000), *Between two shores: Transnational projects and Filipina wives in/from Japan*, Women ‘s Studies International Forum, 23 (4), 431-444 cited in Takeda, 2005:83-4.

4 interviewed 11 November, 2009.

(a) Filipino musicians as early entertainers

The ‘entertainer visa’ dates back to the foreign entertainers who served the occupation army of the General Head Quarters (GHQ) after the end of the World War II (Iguchi, 2001:55). The ways in which the ‘entertainer visa’ has been introduced is not clear but it was applied to the Filipinos who came to Japan and performed in American clubs during the occupation period. Filipinos were in Japan as early as 1886 as musicians accompanying an Italian Circus group (Yu-Jose, 2002: Chapter 3). During the 1920s, dance halls became popular, were filled by foreigners and modern Japanese boys and girls and became the most fashionable places in town. These dance halls and hotels hired Filipino orchestras and bands to perform live music. Filipina historian Yu-Jose writes, “Filipino music would evince not only the ‘pathos of Italian notes’ and the ‘gaiety of Spanish airs’ but also the jazzy tunes of American music - a result of the American colonization of the Philippines” (Yu-Jose, *ibid*: 53). The statistics shows that between 1923 and 1935 more than half of the Filipinos working in Japan were musicians and comprised three to five percent of the jazz musicians in the country. During World War II, jazz was considered as the music of the enemy country so in 1943, the Information Bureau banned its performance and some Filipino musicians were suspected of being spies, were arrested, and their musical records confiscated.

It was only after the post-war period when the GHQ took over and jazz, as well as the Filipino musicians, gained legitimacy and reclaimed its space once again. The Filipino musicians, together with their Japanese counterparts, performed in “off limit” spaces exclusively for the American army where music and American culture flourished. It is not clear how many Filipino musicians were performing in the American clubs of GHQ<sup>5</sup>, but these musicians were the majority of the entertainer visa holders (Sakanaka, 2005: 74). The jazz musicians’ venues were divided into three types: Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA<sup>6</sup>), clubs directly under the army division, and cabaret and dance halls owned by the Japanese. Among the many Filipino musicians, clarinetist Raymond Conde was one of the most prominent. Raymond and his brother formed a Gay Quartet with three Japanese musicians and started to perform in US bases. This group later became a successful company through brokering between the band and the

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5 In 1935 among 111 Filipinos in Japan, 33 were musicians. From 1942-44, of 36 Filipinos in Japan, only one was a musician. In 1947, there were 240 Filipinos which together formed the largest community from Southeast Asia; however, their occupations are unidentified (Yu-Jose, 2002:130-135).

6 The RAA was established by the Japanese government to serve as an official brothel for GHQ in order to prevent the Japanese women to be raped by the Americans. However, it was closed down after several months as it was considered “undemocratic and violating the human rights of women” and due to the wide spread of STDs. It has been estimated that 55,000-70,000 women were working as prostitutes at RAA, including women from the colonies (Dower, 1999=2001: Chapter4).

clubs (Toya, 2005). The early exposure to the Western music through colonization by the Spanish and the Americans developed highly skilled music talent among the Filipinos, with which Japanese musicians could not compete. However, the Filipino musicians are hardly acknowledged in the musical history of Japan<sup>7</sup> as if they were not part of the modernization project. The economic, social, and cultural contributions of the foreigners are often neglected in both social science and popular writings, indicating the limitations of methodological nationalism.

However, not all foreigners are forgotten, exemplifying the geo-political hierarchy and the power structure in the global capitalism. Among the various foreign cultures, the USA is the most acknowledged and has deeply taken root in Japan and in many other countries. Under the powerful shadow of the US, the Philippines have been seen not as a partner or a neighbor but as a deviation of the ‘proper’ USA. Yoshimi (2001) examined the three dimensions of America that are influential on Japanese lives: America as a global power, America as a consuming modern entity, and America as a hybrid and banal country. While these three dimensions collectively contribute to the positive connotations of the imagining of America wittingly or unwittingly, the Philippines which have a longer history of Americanization were considered to be less authentic than the ‘real’ America. During the 1940s to 1950s, American and Filipinos were the only foreign musicians who performed in Japan, but while one has such a deep imprint in the Japanese socio-cultural lives, the other is conveniently forgotten. The historically constructed gaze to situate Asia as the “other” appears prevalent; as Yu-Jose (ibid:58) writes, “When Japanese described Filipinos as being good at music and lovers of jazz, they actually meant Filipinos were not good for anything, except having a good time, and aping the Americans.”

Interestingly, this orientalism cast upon Filipinos was the exact blueprint of how Americans described the Japanese during World War II. Japanese were often represented as ‘apes’ in US political cartoons, who were depicted as trying to mimic what Hitler was doing in Europe. For example, in the cartoon by David Row, a big ape in the front is stamping on the Philippines with a sign written “Annihilation of Cebu” wearing a cap written “Japs” (see Dower:1986=2001:328). The ape is looking back at a human figure in the back named ‘Hitler’ who is stamping on Czechoslovakian territory. Racism represented here is not a dichotomy between ‘black’ and ‘white,’ but it is multi-layered by viewing the West as its ‘masters’ while at the same time trying to be the ‘master’ to its Asian neighbors. While Hitler has a personality, individuality, and self,

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7 For example, Toya (2005) examines the formation of jazz and popular music during the occupation period but the Filipino musicians are described in an extremely limited manner.

the ape is represented under the totalizing gaze and is denied of its self. This complex intersection of inferiority and superiority towards its 'others' contests and destabilizes Japan's position even today. The desire for modernity and mimicking of the US has been deeply embedded in its practices, which then are reflected as Orientalism towards its Asian neighbors, the Philippines. The racial gaze in not admitting contributions made by the Filipino musicians in Japanese modern music can be observed in similar attitudes towards the non-acknowledgement of the contributions of Filipino entertainers in Japanese society today.

(b) From sex tourism to entertainers

Before the entry of the entertainers from Southeast Asia, there was a pretext in the flow of people. The term 'japayuki' was derived from the term 'karayuki,' which is a generic term for Japanese women from rural areas who were sold to work in brothels in Southeast Asia in the 19th Century. Some see the link between the two as a continuation of sexual exploitation of women. However, the more significant link from a structural point of view is sex tourism which started in the late 1960s. The first destination for sex tourism was Taiwan, Province of China, which emerged with the economic investment of Japan in Taiwan, Province of China. Japanese-style night clubs and cabarets were established in areas of Taipei, Peiton, and Tanshuwei, together employing more than 100,000 women (Hinako, 1986). In 1973, when the diplomatic relationship broke down between Taiwan, Province of China and Japan, the destination for sex tourism was shifted to Korea. The number of sex tourists visiting Korea increased rapidly after 1973, and an anti-prostitution campaign was launched at the Seoul airport by the students from Ewha Womans University. Japanese civil society as well as the women's organizations in the Philippines and elsewhere also reacted critically against the sex tourism and exploitation of the other Asian women by Japanese men.

However, sex tourism continued and spread to Thailand and the Philippines in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Customers of sex tourism were largely Japanese, Australians, Americans and Europeans and the Japanese men shared close to 29% of the tourists who are coming to Manila (Eviota, 138). In 1980, 265,640 Japanese tourists visited the Philippines, among which 80% were men, including a large portion of sex tourists (Hinako, *ibid*:150). However, due to the political instability in the Philippines following the assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr. in 1983, who was the fierce opposition to the then President Ferdinand Marcos, by the mid-1980s the number of Japanese tourists dropped to 156,440. In 1984, approximately 120,000 Japanese men visited the

Philippines for sex tours and spent not less than 50,000 yen in four days. In the same year, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan to the Philippines was 7.3 billion yen, so the 6 billion yen spent by Japanese men was an enormous income to the national economy of the Philippines (Hinako, *ibid*:151). The economic and sexual aggression evoked such anti-Japanese sentiment among the Filipinos that it was named the “second aggression” by the Filipino historian Renato Constantino <sup>8</sup> (Satake, 2006:11).

During the 1970s, Japan went under rapid economic development and hotels and bars were established throughout the country. When the Taiwan, Province of China’s government liberalized overseas travel in 1979, these hotels started to organize show business inviting Taiwanese performers. In addition, some Taiwanese women kept the calling cards of Japanese tourists so that when they visited Japan on tourist visas they could contact these Japanese men in order to start up their business. The Taiwanese women knew about Japan and Japanese, so to maximize their profit they avoided the brokers and depended on their personal networks as much as possible (Hinako, *ibid*:146). When the number of Japanese tourists started to decrease in the Philippines, the Japanese brokers who profited from the sex industry started to send Filipino women to Japan instead. The broker system in the Philippines which used to dispatch musicians also remained, so a transnational network of brokers was quickly established between the two countries. In 1982, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was established under the Department of Labor and Employment, which is the state institution for deployment of Philippine overseas workers. The Philippine government also issued an authorization to the workers to work under the “Overseas Performing Artists (OPA)”.

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<sup>8</sup> The first aggression was from December, 1941 to August, 1945 causing 1 million casualties to Filipinos.

Table 1: Destination of Overseas Performing Artists (New Hires)

country	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Japan	70,244	73,246	57,605	70,628	38,533	6,672	4,592	2,380
Rep. of Korea	94	256	237	615	687	487	1,350	1,020
Hong Kong	13	4	5	22	75	42	113	114
UAE	19	16	26	9	14	-	100	78
Bahrain	43	9	-	12	9	24	43	74
Saipan	1	1	-	5	17	30	45	57
Malaysia	30	30	29	51	21	2	22	45
China	13	3	15	47	93	62	21	30
Qatar	-	-	-	1	19	7	15	25
Taiwan , Prpvince of China	8	6	-	2	7	13	3	19
Others	170	114	84	97	20	92	117	59
Total	70,635	73,685	58,001	71,489	39,495	7,431	6,421	3,901

Source: Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (2008)

Japanese immigration also welcomed and endorsed the entry of entertainers. Despite the fact that Japan is known for its tight immigration policy, the acceptance of the OPA in a large scale indicates that the nature of the policy is extremely gender insensitive and prioritizes the economic benefits. Table 1 show that Japan outnumbers other countries in receiving OPAs.

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<sup>9</sup> In the journal of the Immigration Office, stories of Akebono, a famous sumo wrestler from Hawaii, American dancer who is performing at Hotel New Otani and PR officer of the professional baseball team Yakult have been featured in a special issue for 'entertainment' under the title of "We Love Japan!" (Kokusai Jinryu, 1991).

In 2003, 169,359 Filipinos were registered in Japan, among which 141,557, or 83%, were women. According to research on 155 Filipina entertainers in Tokyo, 50% were high school graduates and 46% were university graduates<sup>10</sup>. Most of these workers did not have any experience working as entertainers in the Philippines. Among those who came to Japan as entertainers, only 35% had experience working in the Philippines in agriculture (35%), service (13%), clerical and selling (50%), and professional jobs (2%). This result indicates that the OPAs were not entertainers prior to their entry to Japan, but rather it was the interest of the state and the business to define them as 'entertainers'. Regarding their ages, 73% were between 25 and 44 years old. The total amount of the foreign entertainment industry, including brokers and night clubs, is estimated to be 630 billion yen per year (Takeda, 2005:40). The economic contribution of the migrant women is palpable but it has hardly been acknowledged.

The vulnerability of the entertainer is embodied within every process of migration, including the recruitment and dispatching in the home country, the working environment and social status in the host country. The experience in Japan has brought distress and pain that some require continuous assistance in psycho-social care, medical care, and legal assistance upon returning to their home country (Anolin, 2007). Various studies describe cases of illegal recruiters confiscating the passports of migrant women and forcing them into prostitution (Ballescás, 1992, DAWN, 2005, Takeda, 2005).

According to the research conducted by the Immigration Bureau from May 1995 to March 1996 in the bars and night clubs that hire foreign entertainers, among the 444 total respondents 92.8% were conducting illegal practices (Kokusai Jinryu, 1996). Bad practices included forcing the entertainers work as hostesses, not providing a waiting room, not working in the shop where she is assigned to work, and the guarantees who are supposed to supervise the entertainers were not doing their jobs. In 1996, a Ministerial Ordinance was issued so that the shops which violated the law cannot employ foreign entertainers for five years. In 1997, a revised immigration law was approved which instigated the punishment for those who helped trafficking; however, the effectiveness of these amendments has yet to be examined.

Trafficking cases has been reported earlier but became an official issue only after the US State Ministry has published a Human Trafficking Report in 2004 classifying Japan as a Tier 2 level. Responding to international criticism, the Japanese government tightened its immigration policies, especially the qualifications of the applicants, and also implemented action against human trafficking. The decrease in the number of entries in Table 1 since 2005 is largely due to these revisions.

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<sup>10</sup> Osteria (1994) cited in IOM (1997).

The entertainer visa was originally meant for professional entertainers who can perform activities in theatrical performances, arts, song, dance, sports or any other show business so there is a clear distinction between ‘entertainers,’ ‘hostesses’ (who will provide hosting services such as making drinks) and ‘prostitutes.’ In reality however, in small shops the ‘entertainers’ do everything from cleaning the shop, serving drinks, singing, and dancing, and going out with their customers (*dohan*). The legal protection for these women is extremely weak because the migratory flow is dominated by private brokers who recruit women from low income areas with huge debts so that the women become dependent on them. Moreover, the women have been transferred to different shops (*tobashi*) because the shops can attract new customers by having a ‘new face.’ Without having the opportunity to formally learn Japanese, it was very difficult for the migrant women to figure out their sense of place and who to contact in case of need when they were placed in new shops.

Although the majority of the migrants abide by law, some extend their stay illegally and become ‘undocumented.’ In 2001, the number of overstay from the Philippines was 31,666 (11,593 males and 20,073 females), consisting 13.6% of the total undocumented workers. Ballescás (1992:52) points out that since the entertainers are ‘guests,’ even though they are legally allowed by both governments to work, the legal protection is extremely limited. If the protection measures for legal migrants are limited, it will be even more limited for undocumented workers. Those undocumented workers are more vulnerable to exploitation because they see the state as pervasive and frightening and are constantly afraid of detention and deportation.



Table 2: Consultation cases to the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo

Issues	Jan-June, 2003 <sup>1)</sup>		Total	Jan-June, 2009 <sup>2)</sup>		Total
	Male	Female		Male	Female	
Abuse	-	1	1	-	-	-
Delay or non-payment in salary	3	11	14	1	8	9
Violation of contract	13	91	104	5	9	14
Bad working condition	3	45	48	1	1	-
Health and medical problem	1	9	10	0	3	3
Lack of immigration documents	1	11	12	0	1	1
Sexual abuse	-	1	1	0	2	2
Detention	6	3	9	3	1	4
Death	5	3	8	-	-	-
Others	5	19	24	14	16	30
Total	37	194	231	24	40	64

Source: 1) DAWN, 2005; 2) Data obtained from the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, November 2009

Table 2 shows the list of consultation cases to the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo by the Filipino residents. Ballescas (1992) states that only a handful of Filipino women will consult with the Philippine Embassy, and they would rather depend on the broker or other networks such as church or NGOs. Table 2 already shows an extent of human rights violations, but if this figure is only a small indication, the reality may be much worse<sup>12</sup>. In fact, many formidable cases were much higher in the 1990s. It has been

<sup>12</sup> Among numerous violent events against the Filipina Overseas Contract Workers, the Flor Contemplacion case in

reported that in 1991 there were eighteen deaths, in 1994 thirty-eight cases, and in 1995 twenty-one cases and one hundred and ten detention cases (Ballescás, 2003:555). Many of the deaths were diagnosed as natural deaths due to blood poisoning, pneumonia, asthma, heart failure, respiratory insufficiency, and fulminant hepatitis; however, considering the fact that most of the Filipinos leave the country young and healthy, one would wonder why so many 'natural deaths' have occurred in such a short period of time (Ballescás, 1992:91).

The media reporting is always uneven in covering the issue of migrant workers. If a Japanese person has been killed by a foreigner, especially a migrant worker, it is covered intensively in popular TV shows; but the death of a migrant worker is hardly acknowledged in the news. This asymmetrical media reporting contributes to a discourse that an increasing number of migrants may lead to deterioration of security and an increase in crime rates. The politicians and media who are worried about the crime against Japanese by migrants do not seem as worried about the organized crime syndicate which is expanding its profit through exploitation of the migrant workers. In addition, those who care about the superiority and purity of Japanese culture do not seem to care about the demoralization and dehumanization caused by the sex industry run by Japanese gangsters, which can only flourish by importing migrant women.

The Philippine Embassy explains that the drastic decrease in the figures in 2009 is apparently a reflection of the drop in the number of incoming entertainers<sup>13</sup>. These figures clearly indicate the strong co-relationship between the migration policy and the human rights standards.

Lim and Oishi (1996) point out that aside from the migrant status, the vulnerability of migrant women also comes from their concentration in certain occupations which are not normally covered by the host country's labor laws and social security provisions. When the women are forced into prostitution in night clubs and cabarets, it will not be easy for them to say 'no,' more so for the migrants who tend to think that they will immediately lose their residential status, left with debts or they may not even have a choice if their passports were confiscated and their lives at risk.

Although both the immigration and police know that the entertainer visa has become an instrument for importing Southeast Asian women and making them work under extremely vulnerable conditions, they do not intervene because they are afraid of the brokers and gangsters who make huge profits in the sex and entertainment industry (Sakanaka, *ibid*:78). When the Immigration Bureau started to regulate the entry of

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Singapore and the Sarah Balabagan case in the United Arab Emirates stand out which provoked a controversy at the international level. See Beltran, 1996.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with an OWWA officer, 16 November, 2009

entertainers and imposed strict applications of the law, they encountered fierce opposition ranging from harassments, black mail, law suites, negative campaigns through the media, and finally, pressure from the politicians from both the ruling and opposition parties (Sakanaka, *ibid*:82-87). This indicates that gangsters or organized crime syndicates are involved in running the entertainment industry and can easily exercise their power over politicians and bureaucrats. Neither the migratory flow nor the workplaces in Japan were regulated, and once the mechanism becomes institutionalized the state tacitly endorses it.

What should be noted is that large number of human right abuses did not come to an end with the already alarming figures indicated in Table 2, but continued up to the second generation. Approximately, 100,000-300,000 Japanese Filipino Children (JFC) who are the offspring of international marriages between Japanese and Filipina are estimated to exist without proper registration, educational support, or family. According to the research performed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), among the 106 JFC living in the Philippines, only 36% have been acknowledged by their Japanese fathers, 17% receive financial assistance, and 13% have kept contact with their fathers (Hashimoto, 2009). For the JFC, acknowledgement by their fathers is essential for children to understand where they come from and who they are. However, the statistics indicate that many Japanese fathers take advantage of the Filipino women and eventually abandon their children and partners. Large numbers of JFCs would not have happened at this scale if the relationship was between the two Japanese due to social pressures and legal sanctions. The migration of entertainers was underpinned by the logic of money and desire for sexual pleasure, which reflects the gendered and racist characteristics of the Japanese society. Deprivation of the entitlement of migrant women continues even after they marry Japanese and become spouses with stable visa status<sup>15</sup> .

The presence of migrant women is hardly an issue for either governments except for cases such as the Maricris Sioson happen<sup>16</sup> , and society remains largely indifferent. Except for a few NGOs who established shelters for migrant women<sup>17</sup> , Japanese women in general were not concerned about this issue because the migrant women in night

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<sup>15</sup> Various levels of violence has been reported to NGOs; legal status (harassment related to the extension of visa), restricted information (isolation due to lack of language proficiency), DV, economic deprivation (do not share the living costs or depend on the wife), cultural deprivation (denounce the culture of the migrant women) (Takeda :136). See also KALAKASAN (2006) for narratives of empowerment of migrant women.

<sup>16</sup> In 1991, Maricris Sioson, who worked as a dancer in Fukushima, died. She was 22 years old at that time and the local hospital identified that she was hepatitis. When her body was returned to the Philippines, the doctor identified

that she had more than 10 stabbed, cut, and bruised wounds. A research team from the Philippines was sent to Japan but they could not find evidence that she was being murdered. (Satake, 2002)

<sup>17</sup> Several NGOs were established to provide shelter and support for migrant women since mid 1980s to 1990s among which are HELP (1986), Mizura (1990), Saalaa (1992) and Asian Women Center (1997).

clubs were considered as 'cheap, cunning prostitutes' (Da-anoy, 2006:81). Truong (1996) also points out that the transfer of sexual labor is connected with new forms of capital accumulation and new ideological forces patterning desire and social intimacy. This structure of desire has been maintained through a sexual division of labor: a clear separation between a 'corporate warrior' (*kigyo senshi*) who needs to release his stress through personal services, and a 'professional housewife' (*sengyo shufu*) who stays at home and cares for her children. The integration of sex/love-affected services into the corporate system became institutionalized through a sex tour and later on in night clubs where they employed migrant women. Caring for and caring about the family, community, society, and the state was limited within the confines of the 'imagined community' and neither the Japanese men nor women cared about the migrant women insofar as their two communities of belonging, namely 'corporation' and 'family,' were maintained peacefully. The distinction between 'good women' at home and 'bad women' in night clubs and cabarets served as a powerful rendering of femininity combined with racism, so that migrant women were confined within the discursive space which they themselves did not construct. Their status as an entertainer upon entry to Japan continues to haunt them and hinders their integration into the larger society.

What has to be noted is the embodiment of the state which is racialised and gendered, and which may easily give way to influential groups exercising their power and exerting their own interests. The state has been part and parcel of this migratory stream without considering the negative consequences which have been cast upon the Filipino community as well as their offspring. The reflection on the migratory stream of entertainers reveals the failure of the state to protect its citizens by enforcing the law and complying to international human right standards.

Because the migration of entertainers happened under the legal system officially admitted by two states, the transnational mobility of women poses profound question of a lack of policy intervention. Unfortunately, it was only after the US State Ministry Trafficking Report that the Japanese government began to take this issue seriously. What has been exemplified from the case of 'entertainer visas' is the limitation of the state to be influenced by powerful groups who can constantly appropriate the immigration policy to fulfill the desire of sex and money exercising powers and domination over the bodies of women.

### **(3) Migrant women as care workers**

While the legacy of the negative stereotypes associated with the migrant women hinders

their full integration into society, a new stream of migrants was introduced into care work. This second flow of migrant women was underpinned by a completely different premise when Japan was entering into an aging society at an alarming speed.

(a) Migration of care workers under Economic Partnership Agreement

The establishment of Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Japan and the Philippines (2006) and Indonesia (2007) opened up a new stage of migration in Japan, especially regarding reproductive work. The rapid demographic changes in Japan suggest that Japan requires approximately 400,000-600,000 care workers in the future (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2007), but the prospects remain unclear because the turnover ratio of care workers continues to be high due to low salary and hard work. During the negotiation of the EPA, a proposal was made from the Philippines to send nurses and caregivers as part of the movement of natural persons, and the Japanese negotiators had to accept the proposal in fear of jeopardizing the whole agreement (Asato, 2007; Iguchi, 2005). However, the strong opposition against this acceptance from the Japanese side did not come from nationalist groups but from a professional association. The Japan Nursing Association convinced the government to require that migrant nurses and caregivers should pass the Japanese national examination in nursing within a limited period of time<sup>18</sup>. Until the migrant nurses and caregivers pass the exam in Japanese, they will be treated as ‘candidates.’ Regarding the qualifications, the nurse candidates are graduates of nursing schools who have several years of clinical experience<sup>19</sup>. For the caregiver candidates, because Indonesia did not have a certified caregiver course when the EPA started, the first cohort of Indonesian caregivers was recruited from those who graduated in nursing, but had less than two years of clinical experience. In 2009, the Indonesian government established a certified caregiver course so that from the second cohort the candidates who have a university degree in any major and completed the caregiver course are allowed to apply. For the Philippines, the requirement for the nurse candidates are essentially the same, and the caregiver candidates are the university graduates who have completed the certified caregiver course in the Philippines. In 2008, 208 Indonesian nurses and caregivers arrived and in 2009, 310 Filipinos and 362 Indonesian nurses and caregivers arrived.

The migration of care workers came out not as an immigration policy or labor

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<sup>18</sup> Three years for nurses and four years for caregivers [*kaigo fukushishi*].

<sup>19</sup> Since the education systems differ between Indonesia and the Philippines, clinical experience is required for two years for Indonesia and three years for the Philippines.

policy but as a result of negotiation under the EPA in order to promote free trade. The cost of migration, including recruitment, matching, airfare, and six months language training which costs approximately 3.6 million yen is shouldered by the Japanese government and the hospitals/nursing homes. Moreover, EPA states that the foreign care workers have to be paid no less than national workers. The salaries the workers receive are the same as for nationals, and they are also covered under the national labor law and the social security law. Compared to the other migrants who are often paid less than the Japanese and are working in the “3D” occupations (dangerous, dirty, and difficult), the entitlement that the migrant care workers receive under the EPA are far better<sup>20</sup>. The recruitment, matching, and deployment have been conducted by the state institutions; namely, the Japan International Corporation of Welfare Services (JICWELS), the National Board for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers (NBPIIW), and the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Both the government and the host institutions shouldered the cost of migration which includes recruitment, matching, airfare, language training, and transportation. Six months of Japanese language training are administered for free, and after the workers start working in hospitals and nursing homes, the host institutions are expected to continue to support their Japanese language and nursing/caregiving skills so that the candidates can pass the exam. The EPA goes against the notion of informalization (Sassen, 2002) of the global economy where employers downgrade the working conditions by shifting the workplace to private residential areas, which is difficult to regulate but instead institutionalizes the ‘cost’ of migration of care workers.

According to our research at the Kyushu University Asia Center<sup>21</sup> the Indonesian nurses and caregiver candidates are received very well at hospitals and nursing homes, and the cultural and religious differences did not surface as major issues (Ogawa, 2009). The host institutions are warm and supportive to the migrant careworkers and so far there have been no contract violations, and the candidates are paid the same as their Japanese co-workers<sup>22</sup>. The candidates are protected under the same laws as Japanese co-workers, including the Equal Opportunities Employment Act (EOEA) and enjoy the

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For the first cohort of Indonesian caregiver candidates, the average salary is 161,000 yen. The highest salary is 197,550 yen and the lowest is 120,000 yen. Satomi, Takaharu, “Acceptance of Indonesian and Filipino Nurse and Caregiver Candidates under the EPAs”, Paper presented at the International Conference on Transnational Care Workers from Southeast Asia to Japan: Dialogue between Policy Makers and Scholars, 27 February, 2010, Kyushu University Asia Center.

21 The research titled “Japan’s Opening of its Labor Market in the field of Nursing and Care” (Representative: Shun Ohno) has been funded by Kyushu University Interdisciplinary Programs in Education and Projects in Research Development. The quantitative research was conducted by an interdisciplinary team. The members are Shun Ohno, Yuko Hirano, Yoshichika Kawaguchi, Kiyoshi Adachi, Takeo Ogawa and Reiko Ogawa.

22 Interview with JICWELS officer on 25 November, 2009

same benefits. EOEI states that no gender discrimination is allowed in any job; however, many hospitals and nursing homes prefer female to male workers, thus resulting in a gender imbalance among the migrant workers. This reflects the gender inequality in Japan that the work of care has been constructed predominantly as ‘women’s work.’

Some of the problems identified in the scheme were firstly, the requirement to pass the national exam in Japanese is said to be too difficult to be achieved within the limited period of time. This puts a great pressure on both the employers and the candidates. Secondly, working conditions and support systems differ between institutions, and there is no continuous and systematic system to support the candidates’ study<sup>23</sup> . Thirdly, more information should be provided to both the applicants and the employers, which should include a job description, salaries, and benefits, before the workers establish the contract. Finally, the idea of “brain circulation,” which encourages migrants to gain skills in the host country and eventually return to the country of origin, has been discussed but we have not yet established concrete measures. Although the migration of care workers under the EPA is not meant to supplement shortages in the care workforce, the increasing number of the elderly population and the growing need to provide care shapes the public opinion to be positive to migrant workers.

#### (b) (Ex) Entertainers turning to caregiving work

When the new migrants are well received under the bilateral agreement, the older-generation migrants are increasingly turning to caregiving work. Approximately 200,000 Filipinos reside in Japan, a large portion of which arrived after the 1980s under the entertainer visa. Most of them have settled and become wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law of Japanese nationals. Currently, the major age group is between 30 and 40 years of age, which indicates that these workers cannot remain in the entertainment industry for long. Being inspired by the EPA, more than ten private institutions opened up a course for the Filipinos to gain home helper certificate, and currently there are more than 2,000 Filipinos who have graduated from this course (Takahata, 2009). According to research to nursing homes in Tokyo, among 427 nursing homes 24.8% have employed foreign care workers, of whom 51% were Filipino/a. The reason why the Filipino community is turning to caregiving is mainly because of their children. As mentioned earlier, working as an entertainer has negative connotations, so

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23 The support towards the study for national examination such as dispatch of experts for supervision and implementation of practice examination started from late 2009.

when they become mothers, the migrant women wish to engage in a socially respectable job (Takahata, *ibid*). However, in one study, only 15% of the graduates were able to secure employment at nursing homes. The reason hindering their entry into the caregiving market varies; on the side of the nursing home it ranges from xenophobia and lack of Japanese language skills, since the old cohort of Filipinas never went through formal Japanese language training; and on the side of the Filipino caregivers, the low salary<sup>24</sup> and lack of confidence to work with Japanese can inhibit entry into this field<sup>25</sup>. Many Filipinas are single mothers, so the salary of caregiving is not enough for a single parent family which is still sending money back home to support their families.

Table 3: Comparison between the old and new comer migrant caregivers

	Old Comer Filipinos under Entertainer Visa	New Comer Filipinos under EPA
Status of residence	Permanent residence, spouse visa etc.	Special designated visa up to four years. Renewable for unlimited period once they pass the national examination.
Occupational choice in Japan	Free to choose whatever occupation but in fact limited due to language capacity	Nurse or caregiver candidate. Cannot change their employer.
Qualification	None	Graduate of nursing school, or university graduate of any major and completed 6 month caregiving course certified by the Philippine government
Requirements	Home helper level 2	Have to pass the national examination of caregiver [ <i>kaigo fukushishi</i> ]
Working condition	Same as Japanese staffs working as home helpers	Same as Japanese staffs working as home helpers
Expectations towards caregiving	Shift towards a socially respected job, career development etc.	Means for overseas employment, career development etc.
Difficulties	Low wage, Japanese language ability to keep records	Japanese language ability and national examination

Since the migration of care workers started under EPA, the ethnic community can work as a bridge between the new migrants and the host society. What is needed is the reintegration of the former entertainers into the larger society through vocational

<sup>24</sup> The salary is basically the same as Japanese co-workers, so it is not that the Filipinos are paid less.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with old comer Filipino caregivers on 11 November, 2009.



training and social support to all types of work, which may include care work but are not limited to this field.

#### **(4) Conclusion**

The diversified forms of migration of women into reproductive work represent a deeper process of the transformation of reproductive work. The two flows of migrant caregivers from the Philippines spread over in three decades have already started to intersect, and the site of caregiving will increasingly become the forefront of globalization. When we compare the two global care chains (GCC) in terms of actors and distribution of costs, “the entertainer GCC” is far more risky and costly for the migrants than the “nurse/caregiver GCC” under the EPA. The entertainer GCC has been mediated solely by private brokers and the state lacked proper intervention to ensure the human rights of the migrants. The nurse/caregiver GCC was pursued as a government-to-government project, so the commitment of the state in the whole process of GCC and the workplace where the migrants are placed make them far less vulnerable to exploitation and harm. The entertainer GCC was considered to be part of the entertainment industry while the nurse/caregiver GCC is considered to be part of the national medical and social welfare provisions, thus strictly monitored by the state as well as by society. Although there is a strong pressure towards privatization and deregulation, the state is seen as responsible in providing care provisions to its nation in an acceptable manner so they must ensure the regulated flow of migrant care workers.

The migration of care workers under the EPA was based on the premise of promoting free trade, but the unprecedented level of aging and a shrinking population created an environment that was welcoming and supportive to the migrants. The state commitment on sending and receiving countries for “nurse/caregiver GCC” ensured the fair treatment of the migrants to be equal to nationals in terms of working conditions and protection. One of the major distinctions between sex work and caring for the elderly is the visibility within the society. The space of elderly care where human life has an utmost value provoke a question which was not asked in the case of the entertainers, ‘if the human rights standards of the care workers are not guaranteed how can we expect the migrant care workers to appreciate the life of the elderly?’ If this consciousness towards quality care and respect for life will govern the transnational space for caregiving, there is a potential for opening up a new phase in Japan’s migration history in integrating the migrants as full members of the society with equal rights and responsibilities. However, being an extremely expensive migration project,

EPA does not look sustainable in the long run and there is always a danger of being dominated by the business interest just in the case of ‘entertainer GCC’.

Truong (1996) provocatively suggests that the transnational transfer of labor in reproduction may be seen as a form of ‘social dumping,’ or the ‘dumping’ of unwanted work for the women in the developed countries. If that is the case, reproductive work may become an occupational ‘ghetto’ for those migrant workers who are affordable and flexible. The negative consequences are at least two fold: the family will automatically relegate reproductive work to the migrant women without negotiating their gender role, and reproductive work will continue to be de-valued *unless* the working conditions and protections of the migrants become equal to those enjoyed by nationals.

The “nurse/caregiver GCC” under EPA serves as testing the water for Japan’s future immigration policy and social welfare policy and we are now at the cross road in defining the ways in which we can incorporate the migrant women into the care regime. Otherwise, when affluent middle-class families in the developed countries become dependent on the migrant workers to undertake reproductive work, a “global relationship arises that in some way mirrors the traditional relationship between the sexes” (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2002:11) . The global North has not being able to take care of itself and relegate all the reproductive work to the global South. Then, we will be simply reproducing the gender, racial and class inequality at the global level.

The EPA, although contested, provides a model for the incorporation of migrants into the care regime. Japan’s immigration policy so far has been focusing only on border control of the migrants, labeling them as criminals instead of punishing the real criminals, the traffickers. However, it is time to think about the integration of migrants and by doing so what is important is to acknowledge the contribution of the migrants in all aspects of society. At the same time, the gender equalities and human rights must be achieved in order to make the society a better and kinder place for both migrant and native women and men who are now the partners in this globalized world.

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### **3. Globalization of Care in Taiwan, Province of China:**

#### **From Undutiful Daughter-in-Law to Cold-Blooded Migrant Killer**

*Frank Tsen-Yung Wang*

##### **(1) Introduction**

Scholars on welfare state regimes have discovered that the characteristics of a welfare state in East Asian countries are those of predominantly productivist developmental states with Confucian culture (Holliday, 2000; Wood and Gough, 2006; Kwon, 2005; Lee and Ku, 2007; Jones, 1993). That is, caring for frail family members is considered to be a family responsibility under the influence of Confucianism, rather than a social issue to be dealt with by the State. In terms of public intervention, social policies are subordinate to economic policies, which are aimed at economic development (productivist). Social expenditures are heavily weighted on education or investment in human capital (developmental). Although welfare states in Taiwan, Province of China, South Korea and Japan share these characteristics, what distinguishes Taiwan, Province of China from South Korea and Japan in its response to the aging population is its importation of semi-skilled migrant domestic care workers during the last seventeen years. This is the focus of the present analysis.

Using care as a concept for policy analysis, Williams (2003) has proposed to conceptualize care as the processes of social reproduction involved in meeting the needs of children, the frail elderly, and disabled people. She points out three dimensions that shape the social organization of care; first is the changing forms of the welfare state, second is the level of globalization, and third is the impact of social movements. Therefore, the high level of globalization in the organization of care work in Taiwan, Province of China should be contextualized with regard to the changing welfare state and the collective forms of resistance initiated by women, disabled persons, elderly persons and even migrant workers. As Fraser (1989) pointed out that welfare policy is a contested domain for needs interpretation, the needs for care can be conceptualized as a contested domain among various competing discourses. This paper will focus on the historical shift of the female caregiver, who fails to comply to

dominant discourse on elder care in Taiwan, Province of China, in order to reveal its ideological effects. Two prevailing images about women, the undutiful<sup>1</sup> daughter-in-law and the cold-blooded migrant killer, are investigated to reveal the formation of a global chain of care in Taiwan, Province of China within the last two decades.

This chapter will be composed of five parts. First, the function of Confucian teaching on family ethics to minimize the role of the state and to relegate women to the role of family caregiver in Taiwan, Province of China will be discussed, in order to explain the rise of the care market. Then, I shall trace the formation of the care market, and the reasons why migrant domestic care workers have become the choice for Taiwanese families. Third, migrant labor policy will be examined to show how migrant domestic care workers are legally insufficiently protected against the risk of abuse. Fourth, the discursive construction of migrant domestic care workers as cold-blooded killers is presented to demonstrate the negative and individualized accounts by the media of incidents when migrant workers attacked their employers. Finally, the policies that make the crime possible will be analyzed to deconstruct such images and to reveal possible ways for changes to be made.

## **(2) The undutiful daughter-in-law in the three-generational-family discourse**

Caring for elderly people has long been defined as a family responsibility, and therefore, a women's responsibility, in the Chinese family tradition (Hu, 1995). For years, care for elderly people has been assumed as the responsibility of their families. However, such hegemonic family ideology has been challenged since the political democratization process which began in the late 1980s. These changes in ideology about the family caring for the elderly in Taiwan, Province of China have implications for policy formation and enforcement.

The traditional system enables the government to play a minimum role in the provision of long-term care by defining elder care as a private responsibility. The government provides institutional care to a strictly defined population, namely those elders who are poor and without family. Any attempt to expand the role of government in long-term care is seen as intended to erode the traditional family value system. It is not surprising, then, that when facing the opposition party's request for a public care system for the elderly, former Premier Ho replied that the 'three-generational family' was the government policy toward caring for the elderly, a policy which left caring tasks to families (United News, 1991). This policy on family

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<sup>1</sup> The word 'dutiful' is used here in the Confucian sense, filial piety, in which the duty for each role within the family, including that of the daughter-in-law, is clearly defined.

care was clearly expressed in a policy announcement made by Premier Ho:

The three-generation-family is the ideal type of family in Taiwan, Province of China and the promotion of this ideal type of family should be the future of Chinese elder care. There will be no need for Taiwan, Province of China to develop a comprehensive long term care system like the West, especially the Scandinavian, if all Taiwanese families are three-generation families. Taiwanese people need to preserve our traditional filial responsibility toward our elder parents. That is the root of Chinese culture. Given the declining fiscal situation of the Western governments, we should not follow their footsteps to establish an expensive public elder care system but continue to work hard to preserve the economic achievement which we have earned in the past forty years (United News, Sep. 28, 1991).

The choice of three-generational-family as the framework for interpretation of elder care policy is not coincidental, but has deep historical and cultural roots. The use of family discourse in Chinese politics, the promotion of family values, and the appeal to filial piety in the public domain, can be traced back to traditional Chinese political thinking. Many political scientists have noted that imperial China since the Chou Dynasty (1066-206 B.C.) established its political infrastructure through the extension of the royal family, and considered the integration of family structure and political structure the basis for the long-lasting success of imperial China (W. Wong, 1981).

The ideal Chinese family system has long been recognized as a perfect example of patrilineal patriarchy (Hamilton, 1990; Gates, 1987). Only males were heirs; female children were seen as only a temporarily part of the family, and thus were trained in household skills so they could be married into a friendly, rich and powerful household (Copper, 1990). A man and his sons and grandsons, forming a property-owning corporation, ideally lived together in a continuously expanding household that might encompass the proverbial 'five generations under one roof.' The image of the multi-generational-family has been the symbol of a secure old age for Chinese elderly people because the number of young men and their potential wives represent the amount of caring labor available during their old age. In the patrilineal version of kinship relations, women take a distinctly and overtly inferior place. Because she is considered to be less valuable than a son, almost not a member of the family, a daughter's only legitimate destiny is to marry and become a mother in some other



family<sup>2</sup>. A married woman is expected to act as a humble, servant-like daughter to her parents-in-law and to obey her mother-in-law in everything. Warm and affectionate relations between wife and husband are to be concealed, if they develop, for fear of the mother-in-law's jealous disapproval, in that the security of her old age depends on her son.

With the birth of a son, the daughter-in-law will earn a place in her husband's family; and the status of a daughter-in-law depends upon the number of sons she gives birth to, which attaches the mother more to her sons. As time shifts, with the arrival of a daughter-in-law, she achieves a position of authority as a mother-in-law and her life is improved with the onset of old age (Gallin, 1994; Gates, 1987). This transformation of daughter-in-law to mother-in-law had been normalized as a pattern of living for most Chinese women, a consistent mutually-abusive relationship between old and young female generations. Under this mother/daughter-in-law relationship, a vicious cycle of women's oppression is constructed to extract women's caring labor into the family, in which women are both the oppressor and the oppressed (Hu, 1995). The patriarchic family structure positions women to provide the family with the necessary caring labor. It is within this context that we can fully understand why it is important for a woman to come to her husband's home as a submissive and exploitable bride, because daughter-in-law is the role designated to carry out the caring tasks for elders in a family.

Taiwanese married women are under constant surveillance according to their care work in the family. Those who fail to obey the norm of submissive daughter-in-law and to provide care to family members would be labeled as an "un-dutiful daughter-in-law." The well-established images of obedient daughter-in-law and harsh mother-in-law are deeply rooted in the fables and slang of Taiwan, Province of China's society and have become the norm for examining women's practices of care within the family. When an elderly person is in need of care, "Where is his/her family?" is the question raised and, in fact, it is the daughter-in-law who is scrutinized and examined.

In practice today, it is increasingly difficult for Taiwanese women to stay at home to carry out all care tasks within the family, as in the traditional agricultural economy; nevertheless it remains women's responsibility to manage care work within the

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<sup>2</sup> This patrilineal determination of women's role is reflected in the division of caring tasks for elderly family members between daughters and daughters-in-law. When an elderly family member is in need of care, unmarried daughters can choose not to share the work while daughters-in-law have no option but to take the role of care-givers. The logic is that daughters are supposed to care for elderly members of their husbands' families. In other words, daughters are viewed by Chinese parents as daughters-in-law of other families.

family. 'Pass the dirty work to others' becomes the strategy for the daughters-in-law who cannot or will not care for the family by themselves. The need for substitutes has become a growing market, as Taiwanese women have been incorporated into the labor market since the 1960s, when Taiwan, Province of China's economy started the process of industrialization.


### **(3) Care goes to market**

With the increasing rate of female employment and the aging population, providing care has become difficult in most societies (Taylor-Goody, 2004). The lack of public intervention has turned the rising needs for elder care into a profitable market since the early 1990s. On the top of the care market (see Figure 1), private nursing attendants are the most expensive service that only affluent families can afford to use for a long period of time. The needs for nursing attendants originate from the hospital's requirement that a family member to be available at the bedside when a family member is hospitalized. Due to the shortage of nursing personnel in hospitals and a form of family ethics in general, the daily care of a patient is considered the duty of family. Those families who do not have a spare member have no choice but to hire private nursing attendants. Nursing attendants are very expensive, costing US\$ 60 per day or US\$ 1,800 per month. Thus, most families would use an attendant only as a last resort.

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<sup>3</sup> Nursing attendants refer to those non-professional local care workers who are hired by families to care for patients on a one-on-one basis in the hospital. They are called nursing attendants because they work as an aide to nurses. They work a shift of 12 hours and can work in either the hospital or private houses. Sometimes nursing students will take nursing attendant positions as a part-time job.

Figure 1: Structure of the Care Market in Taiwan, Province of China



With the increasing need for care, some nursing attendants started to care for extra elderly patients at their own homes in order to double or even triple their income. These small units of elderly care were called “unregistered nursing homes” as they were not regulated by any legislation. According to the Elderly Welfare Act, services for the elderly must be provided by non-profit organizations. Nursing homes are regulated by the Nursing Act, and sponsors of nursing homes are required to be licensed nurses. The care units run by semi-skilled nursing attendants are for-profit, thus they neither charitable in nature, nor is the nursing done by professionals. Unregulated by laws and driven by profits, not only the nursing attendants, but also nurses and physicians are participating in this growing business. As a result, a surge of unregistered nursing homes appears in the mid-1990s in response to the rising need for elder care. The government turned a blind eye to this phenomenon. It was only after the 1998 fire tragedy of the unregistered nursing home, Tzu-Ming Nursing Home, which caused 11 casualties, that the government passed amendments to the Elderly Welfare Act to regulate unregistered nursing homes. With the implementation of registration system, the unregistered nursing home is gradually faced out from the market. Currently, the cost for nursing homes varies from US\$ 600 to 1,800 per month, according to location and the quality of services. Nursing homes have now become

major employers of migrant care workers<sup>4</sup> in order to reduce their personnel expenses.

Although the government has been providing public-subsidized home care for elderly people since the 1980s, its target population has mainly been low-income elderly persons. The residual nature of home care service continues to reflect the government's position on familial ideology toward elderly care and its developmental state orientation. Public-subsidized home care has been available to all since 2004, but a 40% co-payment requirement has made home care less attractive than the employment of migrant domestic care workers. Compared with the needs of elder care, public subsidized home care and nursing homes are insignificant. The importation of migrant domestic care workers since 1992, which provides the cheapest (most affordable) care, has made migrant workers the primary providers of home care. The 2000 Population and Housing Census (Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 2000) shows that there were 182,351 elderly persons in need of care, and only 8% of them were institutionalized (see Table 1). Among those living in the community, 78% of them lived with their families, which reflects the preference among Taiwanese families to care their elderly members at home. At the same time, there were 74,793 migrant care workers officially reported to be living in Taiwan, Province of China in 1999 (see Table 3). These care workers were estimated to provide care for approximately 40% of the elderly persons in need of long-term care in Taiwan, Province of China (Lo et al, 2004). The number of migrant care workers working at home to care for frail adults has doubled, and reached 163,818 in 2009. With such rapid growth in the number of migrant care workers, the proportion of care provision by migrant workers now likely exceeds the forty percent estimated in 1999.

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4 The term 'migrant care worker' is used in the general sense to refer to those migrant workers who provide care to either patients, elderly or disabled persons, or children in both the home setting or institutions. In the context of Taiwan, Province of China, a migrant care worker is officially called a 'migrant welfare worker' by the CLA. See Figure 2 for detailed description.



Table 1: Housing Arrangement among the Elderly in Need of Long Term Care

	No. of persons 65+ in need of long term care	%	% among those in the community ( 1 )
Total	182,351	100%	
Living in institutional care	13,969	8%	---
Living alone	25,083	14%	15%
Living with spouse	20,140	11%	12%
Living with adult children	107,815	59%	64%
Living with relatives or friends	15,344	8%	9%

Source: 2000 Population and Housing Census. Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. <http://eng.stat.gov.tw/public/Data/511114261371.rtf> (retrieved on January 26, 2010).

Note (1): 'Those in the community' indicate those elderly persons who do not live in an institutional care facility, and therefore are in need of some type of support for their daily living. The living arrangement indicates the level of family care.

If we examine the composition of the care supply in 2005, we can see the increasing importance of migrant worker in the care market. Chen et al. (2005) reported that the capacity of institutional care was 56,038 and that of public-subsidized home care was 28,138, with a total capacity of 84,176. However, the total number of migrant domestic care workers was 135,659, which constituted two thirds of the capacity provided by the long term care system in Taiwan, Province of China (See Table 2). This figure shows that the migrant domestic care workers provide 62% of long term care services, and the use of migrant care workers continues to grow.

Table 2: Supply of Long Term Care in Taiwan , Province of China

Institutional care (a)	56,038	25%
Public-subsidized home care (a)	28,138	13%
Migrant domestic care worker (b)	135,659	62%
Total	219,835	

Sources: (a) Chen et al. (2005: 50-51); (b) Council of Labor Affairs (2010), <http://statdb.cla.gov.tw/html/mon/monehidx12.htm>

Migrant labor policy has become the most decisive force in shaping the organization of the long term care system in Taiwan, Province of China. The residual nature of long term care policy ‘pushes’ families go to market with the migrant worker as the cheapest and most available type of care. The Council of Labor Affairs (CLA)<sup>5</sup> tried to integrate the long term care system into the needs assessment process in 2005 as a way to regulate the rapid increase in migrant workers. However, the developmental nature of the welfare state, and the reluctance to invest in the elderly and the disabled, has resulted in an under-developed public care system, that lacks an effective managerial capacity in needs assessment to serve the purpose of regulating migrant workers. The sheer number of applications far exceeds the current capacity of the long term care system, and therefore, the task has been resisted by the Ministry of Health, which is in charge of case management services for long term care. The needs for elderly care therefore take on a different path of privatization, not through the family based on Confucian teaching, but through the market via a transnational exchange of caring labors, which Hochschild (2000) called ‘global care chains.’

#### (4) Migrant worker policy

Since the late 1980s, after introduction of the open-door policy in mainland China, manufacturing industry in Taiwan, Province of China has begun to transfer its operations to China, where labor costs are much cheaper. This wave of industrial relocation created a sense of crisis for policy makers in Taiwan, Province of China. Taiwanese employers claimed that relocation was necessary because they could

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<sup>5</sup> The Council of Labor Affairs was established in 1987 under Executive Yuan as a cabinet-level agency in charge of national labor affairs, which will become the Ministry of Labor Affairs in 2011.

not find sufficient labor, and therefore pushed the government to import migrant workers. Liu (2000) argued that the ‘labor shortage’ was constructed by the employers to create competition between local workers and migrant workers and to ensure their own bargaining power. Borrowing from Michael Porter’s ‘the national competitiveness’ (1998) discourse, the Taiwan, Province of China’s government decided to import ‘*weilao*’ (migrant workers, 外勞) since 1992 in order to supply a sufficient labor force for economic development. The migrant worker policy adopted the “guest worker” principle that they will not be granted permanent resident status to prohibit them from permanent settlement. The government has adopted a system of quota control and contract employment to regulate the number of foreign workers. The scope of importation is limited to certain industries and occupations. Two types of migrant workers are imported (see Table 3). The first is manufacturing workers. Only industries in sectors that meet the so-called “3D (dirty, dangerous, and demeaning) criteria” can apply, for these jobs were considered to be those no Taiwanese worker would want to take. This migrant worker policy is targeted to blue-collar workers.

White collar workers and blue collar workers are treated differently, thereby creating a two-tiered system based on class. The work permits for foreign white collar workers<sup>6</sup>, such as professionals, technicians, and managerial workers, are approved on a case-by-case basis, without quota restrictions, and these workers are entitled to permanent residence after working in Taiwan, Province of China with legal jobs for over five years.

Soon after the import of manufacturing workers, the government immediately added the second type of migrant worker, the ‘migrant care worker’ (later called ‘migrant welfare worker’<sup>7</sup>). This migrant care worker policy is presented as a cost-saving solution to the growing demands for paid childcare and eldercare among the expanding nuclear households and the aging population. Therefore, it is considered a type of ‘welfare.’ Ironically, this welfare is not provided by the state, but by the market; what the government does is simply grant the families the legal right to access the market.

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6 The distinction of white collar and blue collar is based upon the salary of migrant workers.

7 The renaming of migrant care worker to migrant welfare worker is significant because it reveals the family ideology by the government. Care for frail family members is a family responsibility. Allowing families to hire a migrant worker is considered a type of welfare, although the family still has to pay.

Table 3: Number of Migrant Workers in Taiwan, Province of China (1992 to 2009)

	Total of Migrant Worker	Welfare Worker (1)	Nursing attendant (at nursing home) (2)	Nursing attendant (at home) (3)	Home helper (4)
1991	2,999	—	—	—	—
1992	15,924	669	—	306	363
1993	97,565	7,525	—	1,320	6,205
1994	151,989	13,458	—	4,257	9,201
1995	189,051	17,407	—	8,902	8,505
1996	236,555	30,255	—	16,308	13,947
1997	248,396	39,112	—	26,233	12,879
1998	270,620	53,368	—	41,844	11,524
1999	294,967	74,793	—	67,063	7,730
2000	326,515	106,331	—	98,508	7,823
2001	304,605	112,934	2,653	101,127	9,154
2002	303,684	120,711	3,377	110,378	6,956
2003	300,150	120,598	4,126	111,598	4,874
2004	314,034	131,067	5,066	123,157	2,844
2005	327,396	144,015	6,093	135,659	2,263
2006	338,755	153,785	7,153	144,238	2,394
2007	357,937	162,228	7,635	152,067	2,526
2008	365,060	168,427	8,482	157,416	2,529
2009	345,294	174,943	8,829	163,818	2,296

Note: (1)=(2)+(3) +(4)

Source: Council of Labour Affairs (2010b) & Council of Labour Affairs (2010c)

In order to apply for a migrant care worker to work at home, the elderly or disabled person has to go to a public hospital to be assessed for his/her instrumental activities of daily living according to the Barthel Index. Those who are scored under 30 are



considered to be in need of intensive care and can apply for a migrant domestic care worker. Then the family has to register with the Long Term Care Management Center to see if home care services can meet the care needs of the family. The purpose of this is to ensure employment opportunities for local workers. However, the match rate was less than 0.1% in 2006 (United News, 2006/04/27).


Each migrant care worker can stay in Taiwan, Province of China no longer than nine years, with each permit lasting for three years, and a maximum of two extensions if the employer is willing to apply. Migrant workers cannot transfer between employers freely, nor can they join unions. They are paid the minimum wage, which is NT\$ 15,840 per month . Employers have to pay the ‘Stable Employment Fee’ of NT\$ 2,000 per month to the government in order to compensate for the possible loss of employment opportunities for local Taiwanese workers. The total amount is thus about NT\$ 180,000 (about US\$ 600) per month. Despite the qualification of employers being subject to strict regulations, the number of Taiwanese families employing migrant domestic care workers has rapidly increased within the past seventeen years (see Table 3). Currently over 180,000 migrant workers, coming from Indonesian, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are legally employed as domestic workers in Taiwan, Province of China (CLA, 2009).

There are three types of migrant care workers (see Figure 2). The government first granted work permits to ‘domestic care workers’ who were employed to take care of the severely ill or disabled, which has become the major type of migrant care worker. Later, the government released a limited number of quotas for the employment of “home helpers” to households with children under the age of 12 or elderly members above the age of 70. Currently, the government has almost stopped issuing quotas for the employment of home helpers, but places no quota restrictions on the employment of migrant nursing attendant/workers. However, such distinctions are usually blurred in practice. Many households thus apply for caretakers with forged documents, but in fact assign them with household chores or childcare. The third type is nursing attendants in institutional care settings, such as nursing homes. Compared with those who work in family settings, migrant workers in institutional care are under the protection of the Labor Standards Law, and therefore have better working conditions than those working in home settings who are not covered by the Law.

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<sup>8</sup> According to the Labor Standard Law, all workers’ wages are guaranteed by the minimum wage in Taiwan, Province of China. It was NT\$15,840 (US\$ 480) in 2006, and was raised to NT\$ 17,280 (US\$ 524) in 2007. However, the wages for migrant workers are de-linked from the raise and remain at NT\$ 15,840.

Figure 2: Classification and distribution of migrant workers in Taiwan, Province of China



The rise of the care market indicates a different form of privatization of care work. As caring for family members is defined as a family responsibility, managing migrant workers is also considered part of the family responsibility. Although the provision of care is directed to migrant workers, the family has to take on their supervision. To minimize the management costs for the state, and to prohibit migrant workers from permanent settlement, the government makes employers obliged to oversee migrant workers. If the migrant worker should run away, the employer is obliged to catch the worker and is penalized, losing the qualification to apply for another migrant care worker until the worker is caught<sup>9</sup>. The nightmare of the Taiwanese housewife, namely the daughter-in-law, is to play the roles of both caregivers for their elder parents and police to catch the migrant worker.

Government policy has thus created fear about migrants running away, and has divided Taiwanese women and migrant care workers into the supervisors and the subordinates (Lin, 2009). The fear that a migrant care worker may run away provides the chance for the broker to manipulate the employers' perceptions and treatment of migrant workers. Lan (2006) reported that Taiwanese brokers tend to construct racially stereotyped images of migrant domestic workers to manipulate employers' perceptions of the migrant workers. For instance, Philippine workers are portrayed as troublesome but capable of speaking English, which is good for teaching children; workers from Vietnam are seen as obedient, culturally-similar and therefore, easy to adapt to the local

<sup>9</sup> This penalty has been abolished since 2008, but this regulation has had a major impact on the relationship between employers and migrant workers, and provides important context for the cases discussed below.

Lifestyle Indonesian workers are construed as docile but lacking in good hygiene habits due to their background as peasants from rural areas.

What is missing from the scene is that these stereotyped images of migrant domestic worker are, in fact, tightly linked with the calculation of profitability among migrant workers, which is shaped by the political economy of the international migrant worker brokerage trade.

### **(5) Media portrayal of migrant domestic care workers as cold-blooded killers**

With the massive presence of migrant domestic care workers in Taiwanese families, a new public image of these migrants has emerged in recent years. Unfortunately, cold-blooded killer is the new image of these immigrant women who provide care at their employers' homes. Since 2003, there has been a surge in the number of news reports on tragic incidents in which migrant domestic care workers attacked their employers. On February 7, 2003, the famous disabled writer and leading figure of the disability movement and National Advisor to the President, Ms. Liu Hsiao, was seriously injured and later died after being attacked by her Indonesian care worker. The headline about this incident in the China Times (February 8, 2003), one of the top three newspapers, was "Possessed by an Evil Spirit? Indonesian care worker went crazy and hurt Liu Hsiao at midnight." When described as such, the migrant worker was considered to be insane, and the cause of the incident went unexplored. After another week, a report in the Taipei Times described and reflected on the incident as follows:

Though mourning her sudden death, Liu's family members said they had **no intention of pressing a lawsuit against the maid**, identified as Vinarsih, who doctors said **suffers from mental problems**. ... "Except love, I have nothing," she (Liu Hsiao) often told colleagues at Eden, a charity group dedicated to promoting welfare for physically challenged people. The 33-year-old maid reportedly **burst into** Liu Hsia's bedroom in the small hours of Friday **in a frenetic bid** to drag her employer from the bed onto the floor. The maid told police that **nightmare** of earthquakes was the cause of her behavior. (Hsu, 2003)

In this context, the employer, Liu Hsiao, was portrayed as a loving and generous person ("Except love, I have nothing"), and her family was willing to forgive the migrant



worker because they “had no intention of pressing a lawsuit against the maid.” The migrant worker was labeled as “suffers from mental problems” with evidence of her unreasonable and violent acts, such as “burst into” and “in a frenetic bid to drag her employer from the bed,” and words of insanity, such as “nightmares of earthquakes” presented in even this short clip. The committed migrant worker was construed to be “insane and mad” in the media, reinforcing the assumption that migrant workers are “different and dangerous others”. The contrast between the loving employer, forgiving family and the insane migrant worker reinforced the division between “us” (the civilized Taiwanese) and “them” (the uncivilized foreigners from under-developed countries).

The chair of CLA at that time, Chen Ju, apologized to Liu’s family when she paid her tribute to Liu at her funeral, stating that “CLA will increase our demands about the professional quality of migrant care workers. In addition, although mental health has been one of the items required during health examinations, we will demand a more sophisticated test to ensure this (Liberty Times, February 10, 2003, p.5).” Her response was based upon the assumption that the tragedy was attributable to the mental problems of the migrant care worker. Vinarsih was charged, but found not guilty by reason of temporary insanity, and was deported on April 1, 2003. Such individualized accounts of this event prevented other interpretations and hid other facts about the incident.

The migrant worker, Vinarsih, had never been interviewed to reveal her perspective until the migrant worker activist group, Taiwan, Province of China International Workers’ Association, visited Vinarsih at the detention center and publicized the interview in a press conference on February 16, 2003. Vinarsih said, “Liu Hsiao weighted 65 kg. It was difficult for me to take care of her. She was kind to me, and I loved her too. I volunteered not to take any days off. For seven months, I was off only on the last day of the Indonesian New Year in December to call home via public phone. Because the phone booth was so far away, I kept running to make the call and running back, because I knew Liu Hsiao was so dependent on me, and might have died without my care” (Ku Yu-Ling, 2009:345-6). The fact that Vinarsih had not taken any days off for seven months was not mentioned in the media, let alone did it become a subject for investigation. Lack of rest among migrant domestic workers is a common phenomenon, and therefore a structural problem, but the dominant individualistic accounts of migrant workers has made this fact invisible to the public. Instead, the media usually blames the victims.

Similar cases took place from time to time, and similar discourses appeared again

and again. The image of the migrant domestic care worker has become more and more negative, to the point that migrant domestic care workers are described not only as “mental patients” but also as “heartless and cold-blooded killers.” A Filipina domestic care worker, Visitacion, reportedly attacked four members of her employer’s family with a knife on September 24, 2006. Three suffered minor injuries. The report on the Taipei News attributed the cause of the attack to personal emotional problems, similar to the case of Vinarsih, and that “she had been in bad mood recently because she had been unable to contact her husband in the Philippines (Chang, 2006).” The picture in Apple News showed Visitacion being arrested by policemen and screaming at the same time, fulfilling the public image of the mad and insane migrant worker. The news report emphasized that the employer was kind enough to invite Visitacion to dine with them together at the same table, which is similar to the portrayal of Liu Hsiao as loving and Liu’s family as forgiving in Vinarsih’s case. In contrast to the employer’s kindness, the migrant worker’s act of violence is seen as heartless and cold-blooded. Since Visitacion used a knife to commit her crime, she was seen as a cold-blooded killer. The killer’s image was represented by animation in Apple News (see Figure 4).



Figure 3: Image of the Insane Migrant Worker, Visitacion  
Source: Apple News (September 25, 2006)




Figure 4: Animated Image of the attack by migrant worker, Visitacion

Source: Apple News (September 25, 2006)

What is different in the case of Visitacion is that one of causes for the attack mentioned by the media was the operation of the migrant worker system. “She might also have learned from her labor brokerage company that the family had decided not to extend her contract (Chang, 2006).” According to the regulations, the extension of a work permit depends on the employer’s willingness. Based on this finding, it was speculated that Visitacion’s attack was an act of revenge. Portraying the migrant worker as a time bomb in the family, Apple News interviewed experts to provide a checklist of ‘symptoms’ that your migrant worker might be on the edge of a mental breakdown. The United Daily News (September 25, 2006) even adopted medical discourse to name this incident as a ‘syndrome’ of contract-extension. The domestic workers have thus been consistently deprived of a voice, and have been replaced by that of experts or police investigators making statements to corroborate public opinion.

## **(6) Deconstructing the Crime Scene**

A close examination of these cases reveals that these migrant workers did not hate their employers. To the contrary, both workers actually cared about their employers so much that they were willing to work without leave until they could not stand any more. What has been missing in the news reports is that these tragedies are the result of social policies. In other words, the one who turns these elderly and disabled persons in need of care into victims of violence is not the migrant workers themselves, but the policy-makers who leave migrant workers as the only source of care, compelling migrant workers to care for their charges without rest. Specifically, migrant worker policy and long term care policy are incorporated into the provision of

care for frail individuals to produce a situation where migrant workers are willing to care for patients without leave until they break down. Both the migrant workers and the patients in need are locked into a vicious circle by policies that portray migrant workers as 'the others' which legitimizes the deprivation of migrant workers' basic rights.

First among these policies is the fact that, according to current long term care policy, families hiring migrant care workers are disqualified from access to public home care services. The underlying assumption is that migrant workers are capable of being the sole source of care so that these families are excluded from receiving public provision of home care. Without affordable public home care as a replacement, families tend to ask migrant domestic workers to work overtime. In order to pay back the loan they took to travel to Taiwan, Province of China as quickly as possible, and to impress their employers by their diligence, many migrant workers are willing to work overtime, and therefore are deprived of regular leave from their duties.

What makes migrant workers unable to resist these abusive work conditions? As guest workers, migrant workers face multiple constraints which leave them in a very inferior position to bargain with their employers. Migrant workers are not 'free laborers' in the market, as they cannot quit their jobs. As the migrant worker cannot change his/her employer and his/her extension depends on the will of the employer, the migrant worker finds it difficult to say no to the employer. In addition, migrant workers cannot join unions, nor can they assert collective bargaining power with the employer, let alone their right to strike. Migrant workers are also time-limited because they cannot stay longer than nine years. Worst of all, the working conditions of these workers are excluded from the regulations of the Labor Standards Law, in which basic labor rights are guaranteed. Therefore, working hours and job description are left for migrant domestic workers to negotiate with their employers on a one-on-one basis. In such an unequal power relationship, it is very difficult for migrant workers to decline employers' requests, both reasonable and unreasonable.

The activist for migrant workers, Yu-Ling Ku (2009), has argued that it is the serious debt that all migrant workers have to borrow before they come that makes them unable to say no to their employers. Although Taiwan, Province of China offers a higher payment level for migrant workers (NT\$ 15,840 per month in 2007) than most Asian countries, becoming a migrant worker in Taiwan, Province of China often leaves migrant workers with heavy debts even before they start to make any money. The complicated application procedure leaves room for a broker system, which typically oversees migrant workers in both the counties of origin and in the

destination country. Many migrant workers borrow money in order to come to work as migrant worker.

Wang (2009) analyzed the transnational labor migration system (the broker) between Vietnam and Taiwan, Province of China and the distribution of broker fees within this transnational broker system. The broker system in Vietnam is a state-run enterprise. According to the Vietnamese government, the maximum fee for migrant workers to travel to Taiwan, Province of China is US\$ 1,235 (see Table 4). However, migrant workers also have to pay brokers at the local level, as well as brokers in Taiwan, Province of China and the Taiwan, Province of China's government. In reality, Wang found that Vietnamese migrant workers have to pay up to US\$ 6,300 in order to come to Taiwan, Province of China, which is equivalent to the total income of fifteen months. According to his study, the average time that Vietnamese workers stay in Taiwan, Province of China is 18.4 months. Therefore, Wang (2009: 218) concludes that most of the earnings of the Vietnamese workers who come to Taiwan, Province of China are taken by the broker systems and the governments.

Table 4: Vietnamese Official Fee Schedule for Migrant Workers

Item	Vietnamese Official Fee Schedule	in US\$	in NTS
Health Examination	VNDS500,000-600,000	31.84~38.22	1051~1261
Training Fee	VND\$1,050,000 (Maximum 3 months)	66.88~200.64	2207~6621
Record Verification	VNDS100,000	6.37	210
Passport	VNDS200,000	12.74	420
Visa to Taiwan	US\$66 (Regular)	66	2178
	US\$99 (Express)	99	3267
Air Travel	VNDS4,700,000-5,000,000	300.00~318.47	9900~10510
Departure Tax	US\$14.00	14	462
Income Tax After Arrival	NT\$1,320(per month)	40	1320
	NT\$15,840(per year)	480	15840
Total		1076.83~1235.44	15840~40770

Source: Bureau of Overseas Employment, Vietnam (2005)

Note: US\$ 1 is equivalent to VND\$ 15,700 and NTS 33 (2005/08)



In Wang's study, the calculation of migrant workers' earnings is optimistic because Wang's estimation of cost depends on the official fee schedule of the brokerage by governments. However, there are many tricks that occur behind closed doors that further decrease migrant workers' earnings. Table 5 is a statement of account of a Vietnamese worker's yearly salary, which sheds light on the actual practices. Most items are listed in the regulations of the Taiwan, Province of China's government policy, except items (1) and (2). Many Vietnamese workers were asked to sign a contract before they could board a plane to fly to Taiwan, Province of China. The contracts state that the migrant worker agrees to save money on a monthly basis, Item (1), and borrow a usurious loan from the broker so that the broker can take money out from their paycheck in advance. These two items make up 46% of the worker's yearly salary. Earning far less than they have expected, migrant workers are often willing to work over-time in order to earn more.

Table 5: Yearly Salary of a Vietnamese Migrant Care Worker in Taiwan, Province of China (in NT\$)

Month Items	1st	2nd	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4th	5 <sup>th</sup>	6th	7 <sup>th</sup>	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th	Total	
Raw Income	15,840	15,840	15,840	15,840	15,840	15,840	15,840	15,840	15,840	15,840	15,840	15,840	190,080	
Deductible Items														
Income Tax for Taiwan	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	10,800	6%
Income Tax for Vietnam	1,584	1,584	1,584	1,584	1,584	1,584	1,584	1,584	1,584	1,584	1,584	1,584	19,008	10%
Savings (1)	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	24,000	13%
Health Examination	1,500					1,500							3,000	2%
Resident Certification	2000												2,000	1%
Broker Service Fee	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	21,600	11%
Principle and Interest of Loan (2)		5,650	5,650	5,650	5,650	5,650	5,650	5,650	5,650	5,650	5,650	5,650	62,150	33%
Health Insurance Fee	422	422	422	422	422	422	422	422	216	308	390	390	4,680	2%
Net Income	5,634	3,484	3,484	3,484	3,484	1,984	3,484	3,484	3,690	3,598	3,516	3,516	42,842	\$1,298
Net Income/Raw Income	36%	22%	22%	22%	22%	13%	22%	22%	23%	23%	22%	22%	23%	

Source: provided by Jin-Ju Wu, worker from Taiwan, Province of China's Immigrant Workers Association (TIWA), Taiwan, Province of China

In general, the migrant workers are not cold-blood killers, nor are their employers mean and keen on exploitation. However, both parties are locked into a vicious cycle that is created by policies that portray migrant workers as 'the other' which legitimizes the deprivation of their basic rights. The ideological effect of the

construction of the concept of the migrant worker as a cold-blooded killer is that the social organization of the global care chain, including state policies and the broker system, are made invisible, and therefore go un-examined and un-criticized by the general public. This is similar to the construction of the image of the un-dutiful daughter-in-law, whereby women are designated to provide care work, therefore reinforcing gender inequality. Both stereotyped images transform structural oppression into interpersonal conflicts. The concept of the “undutiful daughter-in-law” divides women according to age by their role as mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, with the former competing against the latter for the son’s affection. The concept of the migrant worker as a “cold-blooded killer” divides women according to race and class by their role as employer and domestic worker, with the former supervising the latter in constant fear that the worker will run away. Images of “bad women” have been constructed to regulate women’s care work and patterns of struggles among different groups of women. Such patterns have gone on for too long without recognition. It is time to interrupt the cycle of gender bias, and to re-interpret how we understand care work.

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## **4. Women Migrant Laborers of Reproductive/Care Work: The Case of South Korea**

*Eun-Shil Kim*

### **(1) Introduction**

Today, scholars examining the social policies, institutions, and cultures of a particular country are focusing less on their internal dynamics within a particular nation-state than their links within a global system. This change is coming about with the growing awareness that it is necessary to understand globalization in order to understand many changing phenomena in social relations in a nation-state. This study of women migrants in charge of reproductive/care work within South Korean society thus starts from the perspective that these women migrants need to be situated not only within a national context—in which the Korean society influences them and they, in turn, influence Korean society—but also within a transnational context, characterized by hierarchies of nation, gender, class, and race/ethnicity.

The term “globalization” is usually used to refer to both the diverse flows of knowledge, information, people, products, capital, etc., across geographical and cultural boundaries, and to cross-border movement itself. However, beyond promoting these flows and expanding the scope of national institutions and national communication systems, globalization can be seen to be more importantly creating a matrix of interdependence and mutual influence between both the existing nation-states and new regions. For this reason, feminist scholars have pointed out “global connectedness” to be a key feature of globalization (Zimmerman et al, 2006: 3).

After the 1990s, a distinguishing feature of migration within Asia has been its feminization. Not only are more individual women in Asia migrating to other countries as wives in international marriages, entertainers, domestic workers, nannies, and care workers, but middle-aged and older women, who have traditionally excluded from the production-oriented labor markets, are also migrating in greater numbers as reproductive/care workers.

The most important factor influencing migrants’ work conditions and lives is the immigration policies of the countries within which they are living. Accordingly, this chapter attempts to both identify the women who are engaging in reproductive/care



work and the conditions in which they do so by focusing on South Korean government's immigration policies. Moreover, it also attempts to analyze the relationships between the migration of women responsible for reproductive/care work and the issues of both reproductive/care work deficit and transformation of gender relations in South Korea. More broadly, through analyzing how women's migration within Asia is connected to the problem of reproductive/care work deficit in South Korea, this chapter tries to understand the relationship between women's migration within Asia during the era of globalization and the lives of women in each Asian country.

## **(2) Research Background to Globalization and the Crisis of Care**

In this chapter, the terms, "reproductive work" or "care work," are used in the following manner<sup>1</sup>

Care work refers to the multifaceted labor that is required to either reproduce the basic health and welfare of human beings or produce the basic conditions of everyday life. It thus refers to the work of reproduction that occurs within a household, such as home management, housekeeping, laundry, sewing, making meals, etc. This type of reproductive work that occurs within a home is characterized by the fact that it both occurs within social relations and often includes the task of taking care of others. Moreover, in order for the person receiving the care to feel fully satisfied, the feelings, affection, and emotions of the care worker must also be mobilized. Accordingly, rather than referring just to the act of labor itself, reproductive or care work assumes or expects the inclusion of human emotions and feelings for it to be called such.

At present, with care or reproductive work, only the labor portion of that work is granted exchange value and commoditized and commercialized. However, due to the relational character of this work and its historical meaning, this work is often considered to be either woman's work or connected in some way to femininity. Accordingly, when this work is carried out, the degree of emotion or feeling in the individual providing that labor—and not the act of labor itself—is seen to determine both the quality of that labor and the faculty of femininity required for that work. That is, with the social relations embodied in the work considered to be more important than the labor itself, the emotions, personality, and other qualities of the person providing that care are considered very important. This means that the recipients of care work expect to receive

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<sup>1</sup> Many scholars have discussed the notion of care work including Kittay (1999), Engster (2005), etc. Here I am following the notion of care work what authors in *Global Dimensions of Gender and Care work* (2006) are using.

care not within a contractual labor relationship but within a family or family-like relationship.

The concept of “care work” has been used within feminist research for about 40 years. Historically and culturally, care work has been connected to femininity and maternity, and, partly for those reasons, has been systematically devalued. Feminists have argued that care work is neither natural nor essential to women. Nonetheless, they point out that along the globalization era women are emerging as core workers in a global market of care work. With the construction of this global market for care work, not only are the social relations of reproductive labor that have historically taken root in each country being radically reconfigured, but the meaning of care work itself is being re-organized precisely within the economic hierarchies of nation/ethnicity as well as by the political dynamics of gender.

Feminist scholars researching the transnational connectivity of reproductive work created by migrant women have also attempted to illuminate the particular type of globalization being created by the globalization of care work. Much of this research not only views globalization as being intimately connected to care work, but also views the connectivity forged through such care work as gendered, racialized, and classed. The reproductive labor of migrant women is seen to reproduce and reinforce not only gender hierarchies between men and women but also the social hierarchies between the various races and classes, creating various and uneven forms of hierarchies of care. (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002; Zimmerman, Litt and Boss eds. 2006; Sassen 2003; Parrenas, 2001).

Calling this phenomenon the “international division of reproductive labor,” Parrenas analyzes this global chain of care through the lives of Filipina domestic workers in Italy, United States, and the Philippines. With economically developed countries experiencing both an ageing society and an increasing number of women entering the workforce, women from poorer countries come to take up the slack of performing care work and reproductive labor. Meanwhile, within these poorer countries, family members, relatives, or women from either poorer regions or classes, in turn, take up the reproductive labor previously performed by these women.

Women are assigned particular roles and functions within the process of globalization because of the gender stereotype of women being providers of care for their families. Through their migration in the globalization process, these women become important agents of arranging and re-coordinating the hierarchical relations of nations, the gender relations within each nation, and the relations among women in various countries.



In South Korea, several studies have examined the crisis of care or reproduction through the lives of Korean-Chinese migrant women. There is research that examines the emergence of discourse of crisis of reproduction in the Korean-Chinese community of Yanbian in the 1990s with the growing number of Korean-Chinese women from this community going to South Korea to work, producing a shortage of people in charge of reproduction (Kim Eun-Shil and Min Gayoung, 2006); research that examines the long-distance mothering of transnational families and new images of strong motherhood with strong economic power (Lee Hae Eng, 2004); and research that examines the problems affecting families and children with the shortage of care givers, also in Yanbian (Kim Hwa-Sun, 2008). And there is research that examines how care work is understood and practiced within South Korea through the experiences of migrant Korean-Chinese and Filipina women (Park Hong-Joo, 2009).

### **(3) Crisis of Reproduction/Care Work within South Korean Society**

In the 1990s, during an active period of the women's movement, there were efforts to re-evaluate housework as waged labor in order to promote recognition of its social value. This re-evaluation of housework was considered important both during divorce proceedings when property was being divided and for acquiring social recognition for the value of women's labor.

After 2000, care work became an important focus of public discussion, along with the issue of work-family balance in the gender equality policies. This discussion occurred within a social context in which solutions needed to be found both to the shortage of care work providers as more women left home to work, and to the increasing number of older people who needed care with the ageing of South Korean society. It was also due to social policies that began to view care work as the part of job creation programs for women. Since care work was seen to be "naturally" provided by women, these policies assumed that the social crisis of care could be solved relatively cheaply by attracting women from their homes into the marketplace, in order to provide care work.

To the public, however, this government policy was presented as part of a job creation program for women. By creating jobs within the fields of housework and care work, this policy proposed to increase the number of women participating in the job market from 50.1% in 2005 to 55% by 2010. However, with the services of housework, care work, and childcare being supply rather than demand-driven, the level of compensation and work conditions were inadequate to create a labor market that could

attract highly-educated women. Subsequently, stating that the creation of jobs for women should be left up to the market, the Lee Myung-Bak government declared that it would introduce a licensing system that would place the issue of job creation for care work within the frames of its labor and employment policies (Korean Women and Development Institute, 2009). However, with care work considered to be a poor job in South Korea, recruiting care workers remains a serious problem (Korean Women Institute 2007: 7). Therefore, it is at the juncture of these various social conditions that the environment for the import of migrant women as care workers has been created.

In this chapter, three contexts within which the crisis of care and reproductive work has entered public discourse are considered:

1. The crisis of care created with the shortage of people who could take up the slack of housework or childrearing as more women entered the workforce.
2. The shortage of people to look after and care for seniors as the South Korean population ages.
3. The lack of women and wives who could engage in housework or care work within households as it became increasingly difficult for rural or lower-income men to marry in South Korean society in which a relatively strong gendered division of labor is working.

Among the migrant women, this chapter will focus on two groups that provide care/reproductive work within South Korea. One is the Korean-Chinese women who can legally participate in this care service market; the other is the marriage migrant women who have come to South Korea through international marriages and who are now in charge of reproductive labor within their respective households.

#### **(4) Migrant Women Care Workers and South Korean Immigration Policies: Korean-Chinese Migrant Women and Women Marriage Migrants**

Compared to other countries, South Korea does not have many migrant women domestic workers. That is because of the South Korean government's immigration policies. In order to understand the lives of Korean-Chinese and marriage migrant women who work as care/reproductive workers, it is first necessary to understand the immigration policies of the South Korean government.

The South Korean government's immigration policies are a demand-driven system. This system allows for the employment of migrant workers as long as it does not take

away jobs from South Koreans nor have any other adverse effects on South Korean wages and/or labor conditions. Formed along three principles, the first principle of this system is the prevention of the permanent settlement of migrant workers; second is the preference for Korean-Chinese; and third is the minimization of illegal workers and the principle of deportation (Suh Kyung-Suk 2006: recited from Park Hong Joo, 2009: 55-56). If I were to add one more, it would be marriage migrant-centered nature of these immigration policies.

Applying these immigration policies to women migrants, one finds foreign Korean-Chinese and marriage migrant women at their center. Both groups perform the so-called reproductive/care work. While marriage migrant women perform the unpaid labor of reproductive work needed by households and society in being inserted into the marriage system, the Korean-Chinese migrant women provide the paid labor of care work within the care work market in South Korea.

#### **(a) South Korea's Preference for Koreans with Foreign Passports: Permission for Korean-Chinese Migrant Women to Work in the Service Industry**

Migrant workers began to enter South Korea following the '88 Olympics and with the country's greater involvement with the World Trade Organization. The government enabled migrants working in the professional fields to acquire South Korean nationality. However, migrants working in factories or the low-skilled service industry were prevented by the immigration policy from permanently settling down in South Korea. After the end of their labor contract, these migrants were forced by the immigration policy to return to their countries.

The first migrants were workers from South-east Asia and Korean-Chinese who entered the country carrying traditional and modern Chinese medicine. After South Korean companies started experiencing a labor shortage, foreign laborers also started being allowed to enter South Korea as industrial trainees.

From 2004, the South Korean government instituted a foreigner work permit system both to prevent the number of illegal residents and workers in South Korea and to legally import low-skilled laborers. This system enabled companies that could not recruit domestic workers to receive permission from the government to legally hire migrant workers. Within this system, the migrant workers could not change their jobs freely and had to renew their contract with their employers every year. However, within this system, the foreign workers did receive the same worker benefits as South Korean workers.

The first policy for foreign migrant workers, aimed in particular at Koreans with foreign passports, was the <Employment Management System for Koreans with Foreign Passports>, instituted on December 9, 2002. This system aimed to reform the existing system of migrant workers, solve the labor shortage being experienced within the service sector in South Korean society, and satisfy the desires of Koreans with foreign passports to work in the country. This <Employment Management System> gave Koreans living in countries in the Asian region, including China, Russia, and Mongolia, with birth registries or relatives in South Korea, the right to work up to 3 years in certain parts of the service sector in South Korea.

This system, which permitted Koreans with foreign passports to work in the service sector as restaurant servers, caregivers, environmental beautification workers etc., dramatically increased the influx of Korean-Chinese migrant women. According to the 2003 statistics from the Ministry of Labor, after the introduction of this system, 6 out of 10 Korean-Chinese women work in restaurants, and 2 out of 10 work as domestic workers or nannies. According to the Korean Economy Daily (September 23, 2004), among the Korean-Chinese migrant women who have received work visas, 56.8% work in restaurants, 21.5% work as domestic workers or nannies, 13.7% work in manufacturing industry and 5.6% work in construction. Korean-Chinese women are thus concentrated in the low-skill service sector, which South Korean women avoid due to its low wages and physically difficult nature

Table 1: Job situation of Korean-Chinese Migrant Women after the Introduction of the Employment Management System in 2003

	Total number of work visas issued	Restaurants	Domestic workers and nannies	Manufacturing	Construction
Numbers	25,673	14,606	5,521	3,540	1,450
%	100	56.8	21.5	13.7	5.6

Source: Rearranged from the Korean Economy Daily, September 23, 2004

Another point at which the number of middle and older Korean-Chinese women working as domestic workers or caregivers increased in South Korea was in 2007 when the <Visitor Employment System> was put into effect. If the <Employment Permit System> in 2004 allowed only Koreans with foreign nationalities and with certain connections in South Korea to enjoy the privileges of working in the service sector in South Korea, then the <Visitor Employment System>, revised in March 2007, made it

possible for Koreans with foreign nationalities but without any such connections in South Korea to work for 3-5 years in South Korea. With these Koreans with foreign nationalities but no special connections in South Korea allowed to work in South Korea, the number of Korean-Chinese in South Korea greatly increased. In 2008, they made up 50.8% of the total number of migrant workers in South Korea at 223,000. Around this time, the number of middle and older-aged Korean-Chinese migrant women workers, working in domestic or care work also showed a sharp increase, with them coming to make up 90% of the live-in domestic workers within South Korea in 2009.

Among the total number of migrant workers in South Korea, women migrant workers represent 30-35%. Compared to other countries, the number of women migrants is low. That is because the service sector in South Korea is closed to foreigners except for Korean-Chinese migrant workers. The fact that women migrant workers still make up 30-35% of the total migrant workers is due to the presence of Korean-Chinese migrant women. (See Table 2)

Table 2: Korean-Chinese Migrants (Chosunjok Migrants) Registered more than 3 months (TNJ: Total number of Chosunjok, TNM: Total number of migrants, NA: no data available)

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Female	15,325	22,449	27,127	59,290	71,196	82,432	117,688	157,042	180,837	NA
Male	17,118	20,378	21,166	489,93	57,091	63,906	103,837	153,443	182,083	NA
TNJ	32,441	42,827	48,293	108,283	128,287	146,338	221,525	310,485	362,920	363,087
TNM	210,249	229,648	252,457	437,954	468,875	485,144	631,219	765,746	854,007	870,636

Source: Rearranged from Korea Immigration Service, 2009, <http://www.immigration.go.kr/>

#### **(b) Korean-Chinese Migrant Women as Providers of Reproductive/Care Work**

As a result of South Korea's low-fertility and ageing population, the demand for health work, care work, and childcare is rapidly increasing. According to the <Survey on the Current Situation of Families and Care Work> in 2006, not only career women but also full-time housewives experience much material, psychological, and economic stress in providing childcare and care giving to seniors. Among the total number of married women, 30% are career women and 70% are housewives. However, among the fulltime housewives, 94.9% are women who have dropped out of the workforce because of marriage, pregnancy, childbirth, and care giving responsibilities within their families.

Moreover, in order to solve the problem of care giving within families, more than 70% of fulltime housewives rely on both paid and unpaid domestic aides. (Korean Women and Development Institute, 2006).

The primary group that is being induced to migrate to South Korea to fill this gap in South Korean society's reproductive or care work is Korean-Chinese women migrants. Korean-Chinese migrant women represent 31.6% of the total number of migrants and 72.9% (136,171 people) of women migrants. Looking at the number of migrant workers in South Korea according to country and in terms of gender, one can see the high percentage of men. In the case of Philippines, the percentage of women is 20.3%. However, in the case of Korean-Chinese, the percentage of women is 44.6%. Among the Korean-Chinese women migrants in South Korea, those above 45 years of age usually work as domestic aides or care givers, while those younger than 45 years of age usually work in restaurants and motels (Lee Haekyung 2008).

The Korean-Chinese women can work legally in South Korea's service sector. In the case of Filipino or Thai women, they can work as domestic workers in the home of foreigners living in South Korea. However, the Filipino and Thai women who work in Korean families are undocumented workers or illegal residents. Even though English-speaking foreign families or Korean families concerned with their children's English education often search for Filipino women domestic workers through the internet, there are no statistics and no research on this group. Filipino women sometimes become visible in South Korea as marriage migrants, but they prefer to work as hourly domestic aides rather than as live-in domestic workers.

The situation of Korean-Chinese women migrants in South Korea according to their visa type from 2005 to 2008 is shown in table (3). In the category of non-professional employment (E9), shown in the table below, even women with the visa for low-skilled workers probably work as restaurant work, care work, and domestic work. After 2007, due to the institution of the <Visitor Employment System>, many Korean-Chinese women entered South Korea using the visitor employment visa (H2); many of them are now assumed to be doing restaurant work, care giving, and domestic work. Moreover, even among the women registered as a spouse of a Korean national (F21), many of them are assumed to be doing restaurant work, care giving, and domestic work.

Table 3: Situation of Korean-Chinese Women (Chinese Women of Korean Descent)

Year	Total Number of People	Restaurant Business E9A	Cleaning Business E9B	Care giving, Domestic work E9C	Low-skill Jobs (Restaurants, Care giving, Domestic work) E9	Spouse of Korean National F21	Visitor Employment H2
2005	94,092	7,816	62	1,608	7,147	27,329	-
2006	126,365	18,148	114	4,793	3,967	30,912	-
2007	166,854	2,113	13	562	3,386	30,837	102,575
2008	187,914	300	0	114	2,644	29,333	135,403

Source: Korea Immigration Service, 2009, <http://www.immigration.go.kr/>

If so, what does it mean for most Korean-Chinese migrant women to be doing reproductive/care work? In particular, what does it mean in terms of the global division of reproductive work for Korean-Chinese to come to a country like South Korea to provide care work?

In understanding the transnational migration of care work and the global division of labor in terms of reproductive labor, the experiences of Filipino migrant women are illuminating. Much research has pointed out how Filipino migrant women help to create a crisis of care within their own country while solving the crisis of care within Western countries. This research has also disclosed the racialized and classed nature of care work provided by migrant workers. Based on the experiences of Filipino migrant women, this research has shown how the poorer and more Asian a woman is, the more maternal and emotionally-suited she is assumed to be to provide care work.

In particular, in revealing how Filipino women are employees abroad but empowered mothers, wives, community members, and employers in the Philippines, Parrenas' research (2007) has disclosed how the international division of labor in terms of reproduction in the global era is firmly reproducing relations of gender, nation, and class. Moreover, organizations including the Human Rights Watch (2005) and ILO (2004) have reported on how migrant women domestic workers experience discrimination, abuse, sexual violence, food deprivation, confinement, withholding of wages, deportation, and exclusion from various insurance programs, etc. As a result, migrant workers have started demanding "International Guidelines to Protect Migrant Domestic Workers" from countries with large migrant worker populations (recited from Park Hong Joo, 2009:15).

Up to now, there has not been much research on the care work of Korean-Chinese

migrant women. However, Lee Haekyung (2008) and Park Hong Joo (2009), who have studied the lives of domestic workers in South Korean society, state the need for a different approach to study Korean-Chinese migrant women in South Korea since migrant women domestic workers in South Korea have very different experiences from those of the Filipino migrant women domestic workers. Lee Haekyung (2008), for instance, indicates how it is difficult to find in Korean-Chinese migrant women in South Korea experiences of otherizing, exclusion from the migrant community, and sense of isolation common among Filipino women in their countries of migration. Instead, the Korean-Chinese migrant women are not only playing a key role in actively constructing a transnational network but they are also transforming the Korean-Chinese community and family system in China. This particularity the Korean-Chinese migrant women have also been commented on by other studies (Lee Ju-Young 2005; Lee Hae Eng 2005).

However, the fact that Korean-Chinese migrant women have no problem living abroad in South Korea, communicating with South Koreans in Korean, and are entitled to a stable period of employment, does not mean that their lives are necessarily any better or that they are able to create different paths for themselves in the future. Many Korean-Chinese migrant women acknowledge that it is easier for them to come to South Korea because they are Koreans with foreign passports and they like the fact that their families can also come with them to South Korea. However, with their families and friends working and living elsewhere, they also say that it is difficult to create gatherings of “intimacy” or to pursue some other work in the future. These points need to be further researched.

### **(c) Korean-Chinese Migrant Women within the Process of Commodification of Care Work**

The low fertility and ageing population of South Korean society have made the creation of a market in care work necessary. With a rapid increase in the number of women—who used to provide, for free, housework, care giving, child rearing, and looking after seniors within their families—entering the workforce, South Korea began to experience a crisis of care.

Currently in South Korea, it is easy to find ads for migrant domestic workers who will work as companions and caregivers in households with seniors, or as nannies or housekeepers in dual-job households. On the internet, one can also find many agents supplying Korean-Chinese or Filipino housekeepers, maids, domestic aides, etc. However, Filipino workers who are demanded by Koreans could be undocumented



workers or naturalized marriage migrants.

The “Employment Management System” formulated in 2002 that induced a large influx of migrant women domestic workers into South Korea was a special employment policy that allowed Koreans with foreign passports to work in the service sector. South Korean families are allowed to hire migrant women only under the following conditions: if they are a household with more than one child where both parents work; a household with a long-term patient who has been sick for more than 6 months; a household with a “patient more than 65 years old with Alzheimer’s disease or who is immobile,” or a household with a senior more than 80 years old. One foreign domestic worker is allowed per household. In order to hire a foreign domestic worker, the household has to first try for one month to hire a South Korean worker (Ministry of Labor 2002).

Moreover, under the Employment Management System, Koreans with a foreign passport, who have gotten a job in the service sector, may be entitled to the protection of the same labor laws as Korean nationals; however, these labor laws do not apply to domestic workers and personal care givers. That’s because, according to South Korean labor law, the various workers within a household, including domestic aides, care givers, nannies, drivers, and gardeners, are not considered to be “laborers” (Jung Hyung-ok 2006). In everyday life, Korean-Chinese women are called aunts, grandmothers, madams, etc., by the family members, rather than workers, and the labor that they perform is considered to be based on, not on any particular training, but on their accumulated life experiences. Accordingly, many Korean-Chinese migrant women act as real aunts and grandmothers within the families, scolding the young South Korean women, for instance, for not having a good housekeeping skill.

Research on foreign migrant women domestic workers in South Korea is now just beginning. The reason for the absence of much research, not just on migrant domestic workers but on domestic workers in general, is because domestic work has yet to be included in the category of labor. With labor policies and research in South Korea focused solely on official paid laborers, there is a tendency to exclude domestic or care work from the category of labor in the labor market. Accordingly, the domestic work performed by Korean-Chinese migrant women, which constitutes 70% of the care work market in South Korea, is not approached as an issue of care or reproductive work. Instead, the issues of Korean-Chinese migrant women tend to be highlighted in terms of problems with their residence or immigration status in South Korea, or as problems of discrimination amongst Koreans with foreign passports.

Unlike countries like Hong Kong, Singapore, or Taiwan, Province of China, South Korea has no history of formulating policies to try to ease the burden of care within each household— a burden especially felt by career women—through

importing migrant women. In South Korea, it is difficult for individual households to afford live-in domestic aides. According to Yu Kyung-sun (2002) who has researched, in 2002, 113 Korean-Chinese migrant women attending the Seoul Korean-Chinese church, the Korean-Chinese migrant domestic workers are concentrated in dual-job households that are at least middle-class or in households with seniors or single senior men.

Within South Korea, there is almost no wage gap between Korean-Chinese and Korean national domestic aides. Accordingly, some South Korean women have proposed a need for the government to institute a system of visas for domestic worker that would allow them to be hired at a “reasonable price”<sup>2</sup> .

The labor market for domestic service in South Korea is divided into a part time/hourly system for Korean national domestic workers and full time system for migrant women who work as live-in domestic workers. The idea of proper and desirable care work, meanwhile, is constructed through South Korean families and/or consumers of care work in South Korea. With reproductive or care work being social and class constructions, there are no universal characteristics to reproductive or care work. The ideal notion of domestic work that is being constructed in South Korea is thus based on neither Chinese nor Korean-Chinese but on South Korean norms. These norms include rules on sanitation, food recipe, patient-centered service, etc.

The South Korean government has declared that it will help Korean-Chinese migrant women care workers find jobs through its employment support center. However, most Korean-Chinese migrant women do not apply for jobs through this center run by the Ministry of Labor. At this center, the Korean-Chinese migrant women receive about US\$ 200 less the amount of money that they usually receive. Moreover, most of the employers who try to hire Korean-Chinese migrant workers through this center are located in the provinces and they pay about US\$1,000 a month salary. In contrast, the Korean-Chinese migrant workers expect a monthly salary of US\$1,200 and they want to

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<sup>2</sup> The following is a comment by one South Korean citizen left on the South Korean government’s bulletin board in response to the news that the Taiwanese, Singaporean, and Hong Kong governments have institutionalized the recruitment of migrant women domestic workers in order to support the employment of highly-educated women and to solve the problem of low fertility rates: “Create a system of migrant women housekeepers in order to encourage more births. The reasons that career women in South Korea are not having babies after marrying are because of the high costs of raising and educating a child. In South Korea, it costs about US\$ 1,200-\$ 1,500 a month to hire a housekeeper to take care of a child. With additional costs, it costs about US\$ 2,000 a month. The cost of a housekeeper in Singapore or Hong Kong is about US\$300-400 a month. That is because, through its housekeeper visa program, the government prevents migrant women from engaging in work other than housework. If the South Korean government issues these housekeeper visas to foreign women then it will be easier for South Korean women to both work and raise children (Re-cited from Park Hong-Ju, 2009: 3).

work in Seoul or the metropolitan region. It is natural that these parties cannot agree to a contract, having different expectations (Park Hong Joo, 2009).

With the supply care work unable to be matched to its demand through the official channel of the employment support centers, Korean-Chinese migrant women usually pursue employment through other unofficial channels. In order to acquire work as domestic aides, the Korean-Chinese women tend to rely on various unofficial channels including housekeeper agencies, job introduction services, their own personal networks, small employment centers, or Internet job sites, etc. Some of the most important social resources for acquiring a job, however, remain the religious network found in a church or a cathedral, relatives living in South Korea, or the social network of an employer. How and through whom migrant women acquire their jobs influence their labor conditions, wages, relations with their employer, etc. Meanwhile, the most important social resource for many migration women is their personal relations. However, the small scale and unofficial status of their employment routes often end up marginalizing them in trouble.

The Korean-Chinese care workers usually are older and less educated. Lee Haekyung (2008) states that 45 years of age tends to be the lower end of Korean-Chinese women who do care work. They express their work in terms of, “We do what South Koreans do not want to do in order to earn money,” “We just quietly endure,” “We do our work thinking of it in terms of a commodity,” “We serve and sacrifice ourselves in doing this dirty work.” Here, the most important expressions of their work are likely, “We do it for the money” and “We endure it as long as we can.”

As temporary, contractual labor, their jobs tend to be highly unstable; however, even though their labor conditions are poor, it is easy to get a job. In the case of live-in migrant women, because they are nannies or take care of seniors, they have less free use of their own time and their work tends to be more taxing emotionally and physically. In response to the question, “What is the most difficult aspect of being in South Korea?” 66.5% of the Korean-Chinese migrant women answered, “The long and difficult hours of work.” Their salary per month is on average US\$ 1,000-1,300 (Lee Haekyung, 2008).

The Korean-Chinese migrant women often complain of suffering from “serious” health problems after working in South Korea. Because domestic workers are not considered laborers, they do not receive any medical benefits, regardless of whether they are registered or not. Even if they are sick, they do not receive any health care benefits. Even though labor laws apply to migrant women who work in other service sectors such as restaurants and motels, labor laws do not apply to migrant women who work as caregivers or domestic workers. Care workers are not only excluded from

health, safety, or medical insurance programs, they also lack any legal protection when they are laid off, so they cannot, for instance, receive severance pay. South Korean women, who work in the unofficial sector of the labor market, as care workers, housekeepers, caregivers, and childcare workers, are not protected by labor laws either. What care workers want are “stable and long-term employment,” a “social welfare system for when they are sick or do not have work,” “improved social images about domestic work,” and “organizations to fight for better working conditions, including higher wages” (Min, 2009).

The number of Korean-Chinese women becoming ill or suddenly dying after returning to Yanbian is also increasing at an alarming rate. Many Korean-Chinese women who have worked as domestic workers or care givers in South Korea suddenly get sick or die. Or, in some cases, they return to Yanbian because they become ill in South Korea but cannot be treated. One research by Kim Hwa-sun (2008) describes Yanbian in China as a migrant town occupied only by the elderly. Anyone who can work has already left for South Korea; those left behind are those who had returned to Yanbian from South Korea because they could not work or elderly people who live off the money sent from South Korea.

#### **(5) Marriage Migrant Women: Multicultural Policies and Unpaid Care Work**

This section will examine who marriage migrant women are in South Korea, and how the multicultural policies are tried to integrate them into South Korean society and how their reproductive/care work is situated. Recent discourses in South Korea view marriage migrant women as providing a potential solution to the problems of low fertility and ageing society currently confronting South Korea, by reproducing the population and taking care of the elderly. That is, it is assumed that these marriage migrant women will provide South Korean families with the care and reproduction that they need since they are coming to Korean families as family members. Meanwhile, with farming and fishing communities facing, not only a problem of depopulation but also an economic crisis with the passage of the Free Trade Agreement between South Korea and the US, local governments in these regions have also passed ordinances to subsidize the fees and costs associated with international marriages, thus actively encouraging the international marriages of bachelors in their communities. In 2007, 25% of local governments had such ordinances in place.

Approaching marriage migrant women from the perspective of care work, one can immediately see how, in contrast to the paid domestic work of Korean-Chinese migrant

women, they are put in charge of unpaid care work. Most marriage migrant women whom I interviewed engaged in such marriages in order to migrate to a better place, to earn money, to transform their lives, and help their families. That is, making an economic living and being more economically free were both very important motives for migrating. However, once in South Korea, they found making money is not easy. Rather than paid work, they were expected to engage in unpaid reproductive/care work for their husband and families, as well as bear children. Upon bearing children and becoming mothers, they then became further drawn into the South Korean welfare system through its multicultural policy. Meanwhile, they continued to feel a sense of moral duty and obligation to the families that they had left behind, remitting a certain amount of money in order to engage in long distance care. Within the context of South Korea's migrant women policies and legal constraints, however, it was difficult for them to put these transnational desires into practice.

The kind of activities that marriage migrants can engage in and the way that they are integrated into a society are intimately connected to the basic policies of the receiving countries in terms of marriage migrants. Accordingly, here, I will describe how the national policies of the South Korean government define, structure, and control the arena of activity for marriage migrants; how these government policies and the gender ideology of the South Korean society create a certain type of unpaid care work for the marriage migrants; and the implications this unpaid care work has for the lives of marriage migrants in South Korea.

#### **(a) Current Situation of Marriage Migrant Women and the Marriage Migrant Policies of the Government**

At present, there are more than 1.16 million foreigners and 530,000 migrant workers in South Korea (Statistical Report of the Ministry of Law and Justice, March 2009). From 1990 to 2007, there were a total of 320,000 cases of international marriages with 180,000 "foreign brides" living in South Korean society. This number includes 110,000 women who are in South Korea on a F-2 visa for spouses and 70,000 women who have already been naturalized and who have acquired Korean nationality. Moreover, there are more than 10,000 children born to these couples.

**(i) International Marriage Project for Agricultural Community Bachelors and Yanbian Bachelorettes: Directions to Revive the Reproductive Structure of Agricultural Communities**

International marriages in South Korean society first began in the 1990s as a part of a solution aimed at addressing the production and reproduction crisis of agricultural communities (Hong, 2000). However, they really took off only after 2000. With a decline in the prices of agricultural products after the forcible opening of the Korean market to foreign producers following the WTO agreement and the weakening of government subsidies, the household incomes of agricultural communities have dramatically fallen. Meanwhile, the suicides of old bachelors who could not find marriage partners from these communities in the early 1990s, due to their deteriorating social conditions, focused the nation's attention on their plight. Rather than enacting political and economic measures to protect the weakened agricultural economy, however, the South Korean government has tried to solve the economic and depopulation crises of these agricultural communities through importing Korean-Chinese brides.

In 1991, the Ministry of Welfare and Social Services presented the <Plan to Encourage Marriages between Agricultural Community Bachelors and Korean-Chinese Bachelorettes>, using an affiliated institute <Family and Social Welfare Research Committee> to promote marriages between the South Korean bachelors in these agricultural communities and Korean-Chinese women. This soon became a nation-wide effort. Especially after the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China in 1992, the effort to promote such matches became even more active. In this regard, however, South Korea is not unique. Governments in other countries including Japan and Taiwan, Province of China where brides were in short supply had also encouraged such international marriages in the 1980s, viewing international marriages as a way to not only ensure the reproduction of the working classes in these bride-importing countries but also to stabilize the low-income labor market through a continuous supply of cheap labor (Hsia 2004).

With the South Korean farming and fishing communities facing not only depopulation but also an economic crisis through the FTA between South Korean and U.S, local governments began to view marriage migrant women as a potential solution to both problems. Accordingly, they started encouraging these international marriages. Riding on the wave of public support for these international marriages, commercial

matchmaking services also began to participate in these international marriages and became progressively more active.

## **(ii) The Expansion of the International Marriage Market with the Participation of Matchmaking Agencies: The Male-Centered International Marriage Market**

International marriages, which started through the initiative of local governments, really began taking off after the mid-1990s with the participation of commercial matchmaking agents and some religious organizations. Until 1998, international marriage brokers needed the permission and supervision of government organizations to operate but after 1998, needed only the registration of their businesses at the Tax and Revenues Services to operate. The number of matchmaking agencies subsequently exploded from 700 in 1998 to over 2,000 in 2005 (Go Hyun-Woong 2005; Han Geonsoo et al. 2006). In an environment where the matchmaking services had no governmental supervision, the matchmaking soon became a transnational industry after 2000, expanding its reach to include international marriage markets in China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Cambodia, etc.

With the international marriage agencies needing to make marriage successful in order to get the local government subsidies arranged for international marriages, the matching making got to be male-centered and women were not fully informed about the men. Sometimes marriage migrant women were almost coerced into marrying men if the men like the women<sup>3</sup>. In that kind of situation, the matchmaking agents behaved like human trafficking business.

According to figures from the Korea National Statistical Office in 2008, the number of marriage migrant women shows a dramatic increase after 2000 compared to 619 women in 1990. From 1990 to 2007, a total of 219,290 women have migrated to South Korea through marriage. Moreover, in 2008 alone, there were 28,163 cases of marriages between South Korean men and foreign women.

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3 With the human rights infringements of migrant women, including their lack of decision-making power, fraud, extortion, threats, etc., coming to public light, the South Korean government passed the “Law to Manage Marriage Matchmaking Services” in the National Assembly on November. 22, 2007. However, many activists fighting for the rights of marriage migrants criticize this law for being inadequate in preventing the abuse of human rights of migrant women during the marriage process (So Ra-mi, 2006).

Table 4: The Development in Size of Marriage Migrant Women according to Nationality (2000-2008) (Unit: person)

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total number of marriage migrant women	6,945	9,684	10,698	18,751	25,105	30,719	29,665	28,580	28,163
China	3,566	6,977	7,023	13,347	18,489	20,582	14,566	14,484	13,203
Vietnam	77	134	474	1,402	2,461	5,822	10,128	6,610	8,282
The Philippines	1,174	502	838	928	947	980	1,117	1,497	1,857
Japan	819	701	690	844	809	883	1,045	1,206	1,162
Cambodia	*	*	*	19	72	157	394	1,804	659
Thailand	240	182	327	345	324	266	271	524	633
Mongolia	64	118	194	320	504	561	594	745	521
Uzbekistan	43	66	183	328	247	332	314	351	492
USA	231	262	267	322	341	285	331	376	344
unknown	731	742	702	896	911	851	905	983	1,010

Source: Statistical Year Book of Immigration Control, Ministry of Law and Justice, 2009

A transnational business of the influx of Asian women into South Korea as marriage migrants is intimately connected to the growth of matchmaking agencies. In 2008, women from the following nationalities were represented in a declining order: China (46.9%), Vietnam (29.4%), Philippines (6.59%), Japan (4.13%), Cambodia (2.34%), Thailand (2.25%), and Mongolia (1.85%). As always, the Chinese (including Chinese of Korean descent) form the leading group. Recently, with international marriage matchmaking agencies cultivating new markets in Vietnam and Cambodia, the number of women from these two countries has also shown sharp increases.

### **(iii) Emergence of the Government's Social Integration Policy: Marriage Migrants as Targets of Settlement/Adaptation**

International marriages that began to appear in the 1990s are a new phenomenon in South Korean society. At first, people thought of these marriages as being only for older bachelors or lower-income men lacking competitiveness in the marriage market. However, through the media, international marriage has entered the mainstream of public discourse within South Korea. Especially with low fertility and ageing



population becoming social problems, the discourse of marriage migrant women as potentially providing a solution to these problems also began to strengthen. At the same time, the media also started exposing the conditions of severe inequality within which marriage migrant women marry and the human rights abuses from which they suffer.

With the large numbers of racially different Vietnamese and Filipino women being brought into South Korea by international marriage brokers, the number of mixed-race children could not be ignored either. In 2005, the government scrambled to put policies into place to address this issue. After 2005, many policies addressing marriage migrants started to be formulated and now there are in fact too many hearings and service programs for marriage migrants<sup>4</sup>.

For migrant workers who are expected to return to their own countries, the South Korean government only has policies to manage their period of stay and the conditions of this stay. For marriage migrant women who are expected to settle down in South Korean society and become its members, the government classifies the marriage migrants as “marriage immigrants” and has loosened the conditions for them to apply for permanent residency and work in South Korea. If they are a couple with children, they are covered both by South Korea’s basic social security system, and the social security and welfare program for mothers, fathers, and children. Moreover, the government has recently set up a support center for marriage migrants women who are wives of South Koreans and mothers of South Korean children so they can quickly adapt to South Korean society. At this center, various settlement programs are provided including Korean language classes. This type of policies supporting marriage migrant women got merged into <The Social Integration Support Policy of Marriage Migrant Families> in April 2006 (Kim Jung-Sun, 2009: 20).

During this process of change, the international marriage has also become a discursive field of struggle within South Korean society—not just for the protagonists of the international marriages but for diverse agents including the central and local governments, matchmaking agencies, religious groups, NGOs, researchers, and the media. Through the interactions of governmental laws and policies, civil society’s activities, and academic researches, the discourse of international marriage has undergone changes, eventually developing into the multicultural family policy in 2007.

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<sup>4</sup> The service programs directed at marriage migrants can be seen to quite privileged compared to service programs for lower-income people in Korea. Recently, lower-income South Koreans have started complaining about the benefits offered to marriage migrants saying, “What are they receiving more benefits than us even though they are not even South Koreans?” In response to the question of why the service programs for marriage migrants have increased so dramatically, one social policy scholar said that it was because the issue of marriage migrants did not create any conflict of interests between the existing social groups, between government departments. Being considered an issue of a social minority, the programs for marriage migrants could freely grow.

With the formulation and application of governmental policies for marriage migrants, the direction of activism for migrant women has also shifted from providing them with support as “victims” to helping them settle down in South Korea. Accepting the government mandate to help marriage migrant women, many NGOs now engage in a variety of social welfare support, by teaching them Korean language, Korean customs, Korean culture, Korean cooking, etc. All these efforts occur within the framework of “assimilating” the women to Korean culture, established by the government.

**(b) Multicultural Society as the South Korean Policy of Social Integration: Social Integration through Cultural Assimilation and Unpaid Reproductive/Care Work**

In April 2006, the South Korean government introduced the state-led discourse of multiculturalism, suddenly stating the need to transform South Korea into a “multiracial, multicultural” society (Kim Hyun-Mee 2008). Afterwards, the terms “multicultural” or “multiculturalism” became the most powerful terms to explain marriage migrants, as well as the most important frames through which marriage migrants could explain their identity within South Korean society.

International marriages involving foreign women with cultural differences within South Korean society are mainly seen as a medium to solve the crisis of reproduction within agricultural communities and the crisis of family with old bachelor. For instance, the social integration policy for marriage migrants proposes to “help solve the problems of low-fertility and ageing population especially through increasing the birthrate in agricultural areas.” Marriage migrant women are thus viewed as a social group that can help the social problem of reproduction. As such, they are defined as “people who will bear and raise children who will then shoulder and carry forward the future of our society.” Under such government mandate, marriage migrant women are usually integrated into South Korean society through their labor of maintaining their families, getting pregnant, giving birth, and raising children. Accordingly, the social programs to support them also reflect this mandate, helping them take care of their families, get pregnant, give birth, and raise children.

Even though the marriage migrant women are a new group of nationals, they are assigned subordinated roles within the family as wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law in charge of taking care of South Korean families and reproducing South Koreans. In order to perform these roles, it is assumed that they must understand the society and culture of their new country. The term “integration” thus means contributing to and

being loyal to the South Korean society by giving birth and engaging in reproductive labor as the wife of a South Korean man and the mother of South Korean children. In this manner, “integration” is both a cultural and ideological term that is being used to delay the acquisition of social and economic rights by marriage migrant women as nationals.

In most countries, “integration” is the most important process and goal of policies for immigrants. However, what gets defined as “integration” differs for each society. In South Korea, these integration policies have an assimilationist outlook in assuming that these women need to be assimilated into Korean society. In throwing away the languages, cultures, and ways of thinking that they have brought with them to South Korea, and, in learning the new language, culture, customs, way of life, and rules of South Korean society, the marriage migrant women are expected to adapt to and become assimilated into South Korea as its “nationals.” Lying on the other side of this integration policy that stresses adaptation and assimilation is the ethnocentric assumption that South Korean culture is superior. Within this type of social atmosphere, women who refuse to subordinate themselves to this culture are labeled “non-conformists,” become unregistered aliens, and have to return to their countries. For those marriage migrant women, care work within their families is not an option but compulsory.

**(c) Conflict between Unpaid Care Work and the Desire for Economic Resources:  
Marriage Migrant Women as Transnational Subjects with Long-distance Care  
Duties**

Within the global order, people migrate either because they cannot find work within the countries or regions where they live, or because they want to take advantage of the wage differential between countries, in order to receive greater pay for the same work. Marriage migrants also come to South Korea thinking that they can plan a better future for themselves in a better economic environment.

When international marriages began to occur in the 1990s, the South Korean government did not have public policies for marriage migrants. These marriage migrants were merely administered through nationality and immigration laws. With international marriages engaged in fundamentally to solve the marriage problem of lower-class men, the marriage migrants did not start their lives in South Korea as either nationals or foreigners but as wives of Korean nationals. Under the present nationality law, marriage migrants are able to apply for South Korean nationality two years after

their marriage. During the 2-year period, however, the women's legal status within South Korea depends entirely upon the men. Since the acquisition of South Korean nationality for the woman depends upon the husband's sponsorship, it can be indefinitely postponed depending on the husband's decision. In making the woman entirely dependent on her husband, the nationality law thus deprives the women of a channel to engage independently with the South Korean state as nationals. In other words, with the legal rights of the marriage migrants guaranteed only through the husband, the women can get access to their rights only through the position of being a "wife." However, with an increase in the number of marriage migrants and the issue of social integration becoming a social issue, in 2006, the government has redefined migrant women as "marriage immigrants." The social integration policy of marriage immigrants has also been replaced by <Social Integration Support for Women Marriage Immigrant Families> and <Law to Support Multicultural Families>.

However, the target of South Korean society's marriage migrant policies remains, not the migrant women, but international marriage families. Through providing opportunities for marriage migrant women to learn Korean language and Korean culture and to receive government welfare services, the social integration policies try to encourage the integration of marriage migrant women into a patriarchal Korean family order. The social integration policy for marriage migrants is thus not at all interested in the migrant women becoming independent citizens who can negotiate their rights and responsibilities within a public sphere. It is precisely at this point where the structure for forcing marriage migrant women into unpaid care work is created.

In order for these marriage migrants to perform unpaid care work within a stable family, there must also be an ideologically operating "family." With fishing and farming communities still being places where families are mother-in-law-centered and production-oriented, a social environment is created where the marriage migrant women are encouraged to strive for community recognition through performing unpaid care work. However, in the case of nuclear families in urban areas, where the male role as family breadwinner and family head is already shaken, marriage migrant women are expected to reinvigorate broken families and perform family ideologies more faithfully than many South Korean women even though they lack economic or social power. Viewed from such a perspective, the current social integration policy for marriage migrants in South Korean society can be seen as part of a wider project to culturally integrate these women into South Korean society so that they can maintain and reproduce a disintegrating South Korean family.

In coming to South Korea for free, many migrant women think that they have to repay this debt through their labor. They try to do so by engaging in unpaid work, including care work as daughters-in-law, wives, and mothers in the family. At the same time, however, they feel a sense of obligation to their families that they have left behind. Because this sense of obligation cannot be paid through direct care work, they wish to send back money instead. However, the legal policy environment of South Korea makes it extremely difficult for marriage migrants to work outside the family.

Meeting the marriage migrants, one quickly realizes that many of these women come with the hope of making money, improving their lives, and helping their families back home. That is, making money and achieving economic freedom are two important motives for migrating to a richer country. Beyond cultural integration, they want to become economic and social subjects within South Korean society. In this manner, marriage migrants must be understood within the wider sense of being labor migrants. Marriage migrants view current approaches, which recognize them as subjects with a different cultural background and as assimilated members of their current families by learning a new culture, inadequate in solving their problems of socio-economic marginalization. They want to become economically and socially independent subjects. They do not want their desires in life to end up of becoming just a member of a South Korean family.

## **(6) Concluding Remarks**

The South Korean society's crisis of care/reproductive labor has linked with the governmental discourse to integrate women's labor power into society. Problems of work and family balance and low fertility, along with the problem of caring for an ageing population, are precisely some of these crises. Viewed from the perspective of women, however, the care/reproductive work of women has always been in a state of crisis—a crisis that has been approached in the past as problems of power and conflict between the genders within the family, and as problems of a gendered division of labor that further reproduces the social inequality between men and women.

With globalization and the influx of migrant women into South Korea, however, the crisis of care/reproductive work has taken on other dimensions. Through providing domestic work that is part of the problem of juggling work and family for South Korean women, marriage migrant women have helped to relieve the gender conflicts within families. Now, however, these issues of gender—including the gendered division of labor—have become issues of gender and class, involving ethnicity issue of migrant

women domestic workers and South Korean women workers. At the same time, the crisis of reproduction and care within agricultural communities and lower-income groups are also being either ameliorated through the influx of marriage migrant workers or being reconfigured in a different direction. However, with most of the South Korean domestic work market composed of older Korean-Chinese women, South Korea is also participating in a global division of labor in reproductive care chain even though the way in which Koreans with foreign passports are very different from that created by Filipinos domestic workers.

This chapter does not adequately address how the influx of migrant women and South Korea's care/reproductive crisis will reconfigure South Korean society's gender, national, class, and ethnic relations. Instead, it has focused on migrant women care workers. Viewing government migration policies as the most important factor in determining their lives and activities, this chapter has tried to provide a structural explanation of the women migrants who perform the reproductive/care work centered around the South Korean government's migration policies; the particular policy conditions that influence their stay in South Korean society; and the connection of the migration of women in charge of reproductive/care work and the issue of inadequate care work within South Korean society. Having said that, this chapter has yet to analyze the connection between the influx of reproductive/care migrant workers and the changes in gender relations within South Korean society; and the migration of women care workers within Asia and the transnational division of labor. A deeper analysis of the materials used in this chapter is also needed.

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## **5. State bodies or helping bodies? —Reflection on the role of social work in the transformation of marriage migrants in Taiwan, Province of China**

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### **(1) Introduction**

"Migration" has been a component of social work professional services since it began. Providing migrant-related assistance and support has always been among the major practical roles of social work (Addams, 1990; Sakamoto, 2003). The original strategies used by social workers to provide services to migrants were mainly through community organization and development approaches. Professionalization has taken place in the profession of social work all over the world and shifted the practice fields from community to more clinical areas, such as domestic violence and child abuse, thus this ever flourishing social work practice field is gradually disappearing. Nevertheless, with the increased immigration through Europe, America, and even other regions of the world in recent years following globalization, providing services to immigrants has once again become a normative social work practice field. However, this also brings challenges to social workers who are involved in immigrant services because the globalization of political, economic and social ties among or within different regions of the world have become complex (Balgopal, 2000; Lacroix, 2006; Nash and et al., 2006).

Actually, scholars have argued that immigration policy is designed to promote the social and economic integration of immigrants, and therefore it should be separate from national security related policies or rules, such as the Entry and Exit Regulations of country (Fix and Passel, 1994). Other scholars have further noted that whether the individual migrants can successfully adapt to host countries depending on the degree of support and assistance provided to help them integrate into the social and economic conditions of the receiving countries, as well as related policies (Edmonston and Passel, 1994). In addition, social work scholars also point out that the ability of social workers' attitude toward and services provided to migrants and their families, to some extent, are determined by their ability to perform the duties described in the immigration policy, other than their arbitrary professional decisions. Therefore, the immigrants' wellbeing in

receiving countries depends largely on the guidance of ever changing immigrant policy and the social work practitioners who are involved in the field of immigration social work.

In addition, some studies focusing on immigration social work practices and immigration policy have pointed out that social work services have played a central part in implementing immigration policy, and the social worker as the major agent or professional, in providing immigrant related public and settlement services, social work profession need to consider how, within the existing immigration policy, to provide appropriate services and pay attention to the changes in the demographic characteristics, migrants' needs, and the opportunities and constraints of social work practice regulated by current immigration policy (Padilla, 1997). However, very little research has focused on these issues, especially through the perspective of the immigrant community (Le-Doux and Stephens, 1992).

With the economic and social development since the early 1980s, Taiwan, Province of China has gradually become a member of the globalized nations and become one of the major host countries for immigrants. Currently, there are two main types of immigrants in Taiwan, Province of China, one is marriage migrants, or so-called foreign spouses, and the other is the migrant workers. An examination of the immigration policy and the function of social work regulated in it reveals that immigration social work practice in Taiwan, Province of China has focused more on providing assistance to marriage migrants, or named foreign spouses than working migrants, and has helped them to adapt to daily life issues by rendering related services. In response to the increasing number of foreign spouses in Taiwan, Province of China every year, Department of Social Affairs of Ministry of the Interior has developed and implemented the "Family Services Center of Foreign Spouses" to subsidize local governments setting up an official governmental segment and employ social work case management strategy providing the full range of integrated services to enhance community acceptance and service capabilities, and to strengthen the use of resources of foreign spouses and their families to satisfy the needs of foreign spouses and their families since 2005 (Ministry of the Interior of Social Affairs, 2006). There are currently 33 county centers and 385 community support centers in Taiwan, Province of China. There are a total of 75 professional social workers involved in these government-financed centers not including the personnel involved in voluntary or nongovernmental organizations.

There has been increasing discussion of marriage migrants in Taiwan, Province of

China. However, the major issues of these discussions has focused more on citizenship, border management, the right to work and the ideology of constructing a multicultural society, and seldom on the experiences of marriage migrants in assessing governmental social services or welfare system. The author argues that, based on related studies, the daily practices of social workers, especially those within government-financed immigration service organizations, are critical in transforming marriage migrants through the platform of immigrant services and regulations. This article will explore the issues regarding the role of social worker in the transformation of marriage migrants through the practice of social workers of the Foreign Spouses Family Service Centers under related welfare policy and social service regulations related to marriage migrants in Taiwan, Province of China. This article will first present a picture of marriage migrants in Taiwan, Province of China. Then, the development of Foreign Spouses Family Service Centers run by local governments will be discussed to illustrate the experiences of marriage migrants in accessing social services and support they can obtain through this local governmental system. Finally, the report will discuss the roles presented by social workers who, on the one hand, work as an assisting agent, providing services to those in need; but, on the other, also act as a state agent, implementing an acculturation process toward marriage migrants through diverse programs and daily practice.

## **(2) The Trends of Marriage Migrants in Taiwan, Province of China**

The phenomenon of international marriage in Taiwan, Province of China can generally be traced back to the late 1980s (Hsia, 1997). The percentage of international marriages in total marriages increased from 15.69% to 31.86% between 1998 and 2003, peaked around 2003, then gradually decreased, and accounted for 14.03% of the total number of marriages in 2008 (See Table 1). There were 154,866 marriages in 2008 and 21,729 were international marriages, including marriage between Taiwanese and people from mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Southeast Asia, and other countries (See Table 1). The total number of marriage migrants was 428,635 in November 2009. There are 179,799 marriage migrants from China (including those from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau), representing 66.43%, 128,307 Southeast Asian spouses, representing 29.93%, and only a few from other countries. The majority of these marriage migrants represent Taiwanese men that marry foreign brides, and 92.44% of the migrants were female in 2009 (National Immigration Office of Taiwan, Province of China, 2009).


Table 1: Registered Number of Marriages by Nationality of Spouses in Taiwan, Province of China 1998–2009

Total Number	Taiwanese		Nationality of Foreign Spouses											
			Sub-total		Chinese				Foreigners					
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	China	Macau and Hong Kong	Number	%	Southeast Asia	%	Other	%
145,976	123,971	84.31	22,905	15.69	12,451	8.53	12,167	284	10,454	7.16	...	...	...	...
173,209	140,946	81.37	32,263	18.63	17,589	10.15	17,288	301	14,674	8.47	...	...	...	...
181,642	136,676	75.24	44,966	24.76	23,628	13.01	23,297	331	21,338	11.75	...	...	...	...
170,515	124,313	72.9	46,202	27.1	26,797	15.72	26,516	281	19,405	11.38	17,512	10.27	1,893	1.11
172,655	123,642	71.61	49,013	28.39	28,906	16.74	28,603	303	20,107	11.65	18,037	10.45	2,070	1.2
171,483	116,849	68.14	54,634	31.86	34,991	20.4	34,685	306	19,643	11.45	17,351	10.12	2,292	1.34
131,453	100,143	76.18	31,310	23.82	10,972	8.35	10,642	330	20,338	15.47	18,103	13.77	2,235	1.7
141,140	112,713	79.86	28,427	20.14	14,619	10.36	14,258	361	13,808	9.78	11,454	8.12	2,354	1.67
142,669	118,739	83.23	23,930	16.77	14,406	10.1	13,964	442	9,524	6.68	6,950	4.87	2,574	1.8
135,041	110,341	81.71	24,700	18.29	15,146	11.22	14,721	425	9,554	7.07	6,952	5.15	2,602	1.93
154,866	133,137	85.97	21,729	14.03	12,772	8.25	12,274	498	8,957	5.78	6,009	3.88	2,948	1.9

sources:

1. Department of Population, Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan, Province of China.  
<http://www.moi.gov.tw>.
2. National Immigration Office of Taiwan, Province of China, [www.immigration.gov.tw/](http://www.immigration.gov.tw/)

Figure 1: Proportion of International Marriage in Taiwan, Province of China



Source: Department of Population, Ministry of the Interior, Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China, 2009



Researchers have argued that the growing number of international marriages between Taiwan, Province of China, Southeast Asia and China, especially after 1980, is parallel to the globalization of capital of Taiwan, Province of China within this region. One of the researchers noted that the trends of the Southeast Asian women marrying Taiwanese men parallels the trends of the political-economic development between Taiwan, Province of China and Southeast Asian countries and reflects the development of economic cooperation in the Asian region. Furthermore, this correlation becomes significant after 1980 (Hsia, 2001). Economists have claimed that the Taiwanese businessmen/manufacturers started going abroad to find a low-cost and efficient production base, since the late 1980s, when Taiwan, Province of China faced difficult economic situations, both within the island and globally, such as land acquisition difficulties, labor costs increase, environmental awareness of citizens, slowing down of factory constructions in order to maintain the important role of Taiwan, Province of China in the international division of labor. At the same time, some ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, for example Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are in need of a large number of investments to create job opportunities for their citizens. (梁銘華, 2003) The increase in business travel was intertwined with the economic and political policy by the government known as the “Go-South Policy.” The Taiwan, Province of China’s Government has formally carried out a “Go-South Policy” three times successively between 1994-2008, during the period of former President Lee Teng-Hui and Chen Shui-Bian in order to disperse investment risks and reduce over dependence on Mainland China’s market (梁銘華, 2003) .

This political-economic relationship between Taiwan, Province of China and the less developed Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries since late 1980 is associated with a positive correlation between economic investment and the emigration of women from Southeast Asia that then become foreign brides in Taiwan, Province of China. For example, Hsiao Zhao-Juan (2000) found that medium-business migration and short-term assignment to Southeast Asian countries for Taiwanese men, combined with the rise of matchmaking businesses, led to many international marriages in Taiwan, Province of China. The foreign brides were most commonly from Thailand and the Philippines in the mid 1980s. Then, the majority of foreign brides came from Thailand by the end of 1980s. The number of Indonesian and the Philippino wives increased dramatically when Taiwanese investment in Indonesia and the Philippines began around 1990 (Hsia, 1996; Jones and Shen, 2008). The number of Vietnamese brides have become the highest in all host countries since the Vietnamese Government has committed to improve the domestic economic environment

through "Private Law" and "Company Law" in 1990, and this trend also can be found in Taiwan, Province of China, especially during the period of 1994-1996 (Liao Ya-Ting, 2002).

Table2.The number of marriages migrants by nationality in Taiwan, Province of China,2004-2009

Nationality of Foreign Spouses										
Year	Total Numbers	Chinese <sup>a</sup>	%	Southeast Asia	%	East Asia	%	Other foreigners	%	
2004	336,483	214,679	63.8	111,461	33.13	2,914	0.87	7,429	2.21	
2005	364,596	233,697	64.1	119,587	31.21	3,101	0.85	8,211	2.25	
2006	383,204	249,118	65.01	121,962	30.56	3,264	0.85	8,860	2.31	
2007	399,038	262,421	65.76	123,708	29.92	3,478	0.87	9,431	2.36	
2008	413,421	274,173	66.32	125,550	29.29	3,650	0.88	10,048	2.43	

Source: Department of Population, Ministry of the Interior, Taipei, Taiwan. Province of China

a: Including those from China, Hong Kong and Macao.

Table 3. Nationalities of marriage migrants from Southeast Asia, 2004-2009

Nationality of Foreign Spouse from Southeast Asia											
Year	Total Numbers	Vietnam	%	Indonesia	%	Thailand	%	Philippines	%	Cambodia	
2004	111,461	214,679	63.8	111,461	33.13	2,914	0.87	7,429	2.21	4,356	
2005	119,587	233,697	64.1	119,587	31.21	3,101	0.85	8,211	2.25	4,541	
2006	121,962	249,118	65.01	121,962	30.56	3,264	0.85	8,860	2.31	4,514	
2007	123,708	262,421	65.76	123,708	29.92	3,478	0.87	9,431	2.36	4,502	
2008	125,550	274,173	66.32	125,550	29.29	3,650	0.88	10,048	2.43	4,423	
2009	128,307	284,741	66.43	128,307	29.93	4,111	0.96	11,476	2.68	4,346	

Source: Department of Population, Ministry of the Interior, Taipei, Taiwan. Province of China

Aside from the economic and political forces, the growing numbers of marriage migrants in Taiwan, Province of China, both from mainland China and South Asia, is also related to the domestic marriage markets. An increasing proportion of women in Taiwan, Province of China remain single due to the changing status in education and the economy, (Tsai, 2004; Jones and Chen, 2008). Researchers have found that the majority of men who marry foreign women are less educated men, who are over-represented in rural areas in agricultural occupations, and face difficulties finding in suitable partners through the domestic marriage market (Jones 2006:13–16; Jones and Chen, 2007).

Although the increase in international marriage is closely related to the intensification of economic interdependence and geopolitical situation of Taiwan, Province of China within the Asian region, the ideology of Taiwanese society has not

changed accordingly. There are a lot of negative images against the marriage migrants in the media. Some of the typical slogans say foreign brides are in false marriages, and they are in fact prostitutes (Chen and Chen, 2010) or they are blamed for their personal capacities, such as "poor quality" (Pei-Chia Lan, 2004), and "bogus marriages, real wage" (Chen and Chen, 2010). As a result, there are many negative feelings toward marriage migrants at the community level. In addition to this negative atmosphere, a number of empirical studies also show that marriage migrants often encounter various difficulties in marriage and family life because of the language barrier, cultural alienation and other factors (蕭昭娟·2000; 邱方晞·2003). Temporary adjustment problems encountered by foreign spouses include language barriers, cultural differences, social discrimination, domestic violence, child education and so on (賴珮玲, 2006). These situations sometimes accelerate with distrust and hostility from their husband and family members' further marginalizing marriage migrants in the society and place them with double barriers, the unfriendly atmosphere in the whole society and the difficulties faced by them within their personal family, and without voices in the society.

### **(3) The Development of Care and Services for Marriage Migrants in Taiwan, Province of China**

Despite of difficulties at the socio-cultural levels, foreign brides, and the second generation children with foreign-bride mothers, have become prevalent in Taiwan, Province of China. Their lives and well being have gradually received public attention. Various stake-holders, including civil society, third sectors and the government, have established many related programs and services. Most of the scholars and professionals who have been involved in providing services to marriage immigrants in Taiwan, Province of China cite the work of Meinung People's Association (美濃愛鄉協進會) (Meinung People's Association美濃愛鄉協進會, <http://mpa.ngo.org.tw>, 2010).

Table 4 Development of Government policy and Services for Marriage Migrants in Taiwan, Province of China, 1987-2008

year	Government Strategies		Efforts from Civil Society	
	Immigration Policies	Welfare Policy	Trans-Asia Sisters Association (TASAT)	Taiwan New Immigrants Care Association (台灣新移民關懷協會)
1987	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Lifting of martial law</li> <li>➤ Allowing citizens visiting their relatives living in mainland</li> </ul>			
1992	Amendments to the Law of Organization			
1994			Teaching foreign brides Chinese in Meinung	
1995			The Meinung People's Association start-up literacy classes for foreign brides in this area.	
1997				
1998				
1999	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Immigration Act was promulgated on 21 May 1999.</li> <li>2. Amendments of the Implementation Plan for Foreign Brides Orientation Counseling and Services"</li> </ol>			Encouraged by Philippines government and church system
2001			Regular attending members of the classes start doing fund-raising for setting up a gathering place for their own.	
2002			Cooperating with several Community University in Taipei County and spreading out this literacy program and establishing courses about daily life of emigrants for foreign brides in the north part of Taiwan.	Established a local association named 台北市外籍新娘成長關懷協會



2003		Developing the guideline for operating the Implementation Plan for Foreign Brides Orientation Counseling and Services (外籍與大陸配偶照顧輔導措施)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Establishing a national wide organization named Trans-Asia Sisters Association (TASAT)</li> <li>2. Joining the Alliance of Amending the law of Human Rights for Immigrants in Taiwan (移民/住人權修法聯盟) Website : <a href="http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/migrants2006">http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/migrants2006</a></li> </ol>	Joining the Alliance of Amending the law of Human Rights for Immigrants in Taiwan
2004				
2005	Establishing the Fund for Orientation services and Guidance of Foreign Spouses (外籍配偶照顧輔導基金)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Developing the plan for setting up Foreign Spouse Family Service Center in local counties</li> <li>2. Some centers had been set up in this year</li> </ol>	Establishing a formal office in the northern part of Taiwan	
2006	Application for naturalization must be accompanied by a certification of receiving civil education for 100 hours.			Expanded to a national NGO named Taiwan New Immigrants Care Association(台灣新移民成長關懷協會)
2007	National Immigration Agency (NIA) has been officially formed since 2 January 2007.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The main dedicated unit of the Fund for Orientation services and Guidance of Foreign Spouses is transferred to NIA of the Ministry of Interior.</li> <li>2. The plan for setting up Foreign Spouse Family Service Center has been amended by Ministry of the Interior</li> <li>2. 24 centers were operating in this year.</li> </ol>		
2008	Abolition of the financial proof when foreign spouses apply for naturalization.			


"Meinung People's Association" decided to work with Kaohsiung County Meinung Township Long-Du Elementary School and launched a literacy program (識字班) for foreign brides in 1994. The program, inspired by Paulo Freire's work in South America, uses an empowerment approach to help those who emigrate into Meinung through marriage to learn the Chinese language, fulfill their needs, form a self help group for community integration and dialogue with the society, (Hsia, 2002). This Meinung program, led to the development of literacy classrooms (識字班) and diverse supportive

programs by many scholars and social groups based on different rationale, such as multiculturalism, social care and assisting future generations, and social stability. The Ministry of the Interior has also published the "The Implementation Plan for Foreign Brides Orientation Counseling and Services" (外籍新娘生活適應輔導實施計劃) at the end of 1999. Taiwan, Province of China Government has thus become formally involved in immigrant services in order to "enhance their ability to adapt their language and life so that they can smoothly integrate into our living environment, and form a happy family (Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan, Province of China Government, 1999). (See Table 4)

The Executive Yuan further decided to raise a total of 3 billion in funds (around 93.5 million US dollars), and established "The Fund for Orientation Services and Guidance for Foreign Spouses" (外籍配偶照顧輔導基金) to provide comprehensive services to marriage migrants and strengthen the new immigration service system. This was another turning point for immigrant services in Taiwan, Province of China. The financial resources, allowed the Department of Social Affairs of Ministry of the Interior to integrate immigration policies, social welfare and statutory social work systems for marriage migrants and instruct county governments to establish an office named Foreign Spouse Family Service Center for providing these related services for marriage migrants all over the country the same year. The Department of Social Affairs has subsidized funding to local governments and non-governmental organizations annually for providing supportive and social work intervention services to foreign spouses and their families through the strategy of contracting out these services.

33 Foreign Spouse Family Service Centers and 368 Community Service Bases were set up in Taiwan, Province of China by June 2009. There are 62 professionally trained social workers, 22 social work supervisors and around 1000 volunteers involved in these county family service centers for foreign spouses. Services provided by these county centers include general consultation services (through hotline, interpersonal interview and home visiting), case management, adult education, group social work services or other activities, multi-cultural exchange activities, social integration related programs, general supportive services, supportive network building, routine administrative duties, and participation in various advocacy activities and meetings at different levels (Ministry of Interior, 2010).

Figure 2: Local Government offices involving in immigrants services



Source: 林鳳珠, 2008, 花蓮縣外籍配偶服務簡介。台灣花蓮：花蓮縣政府社會處婦幼課。

#### (4) The Role of Social Work in the Immigrants Services in Taiwan, Province of China

Most NGOs involving the immigrant services and advocacy activities gradually started receiving government funding after the government launched “The Fund for Orientation Services and Guidance of Foreign Spouses” (外籍配偶照顧輔導基金) due to the constraints of financial resources encountered by non-profit and non-governmental organizations during financial crisis since 1995, even though there are some NGOs remain self-financed status. County Family Service Centers for Foreign Brides have become the major platform for providing supportive and social work intervention services for marriage migrants in Taiwan, Province of China. Therefore, these centers and the social workers who are working in these governments financed centers serve a dual function. On the one hand, these institutions are expected to be like a ‘mother’s home’ for marriage migrants, where they can acquire the

necessary kinship-kind support and advices about marriage relations and life. However, on the other hand, they also become a site of control for the state to exert its power over the bodies of marriage migrants since the centers are fully financed by the government. The author has been actively involved in County Family Service Centers for Foreign Brides of Haulien County, a county located at the eastside of Taiwan, Province of China, since 2007. There are several issues that must be addressed for the improvement of immigrant services, both for the development of immigration social work and its targeted clients, the wellbeing of immigrants as a whole in Taiwan, Province of China.

### ***Policy level***

A variety of initiatives and strategic changes have taken place across various levels and types of public services in the country since “multiculturalism” was proclaimed in the Constitution of the Republic of China since 1997. The County Family Service Center of Foreign Brides has adopted multiculturalism as the main ideology for providing services. However, the ideology of multiculturalism could be best implemented in through both an emancipatory approach and assimilatory approach, since both approaches address the wellbeing of marriage migrants through a multicultural society. Indeed, some critics have argued that the effort by the immigrant services should adopt an emancipatory approach rather than an assimilatory approach, because the later is based on the assumption that conformity implicitly represents successful ‘integration’ (Zhang, 2003). Besides, this is unclear on both the ideology and practice level in Taiwan, Province of China. Furthermore, the ideology the state government of Taiwan, Province of China toward marriage migrants and the ideology behind the social care policies and programs designed for marriage migrants remain under debate. These all require further discussion in the future in order to provide a more suitable social support system and social work services to allow these new comers to live with dignity in this “new found land.”

### ***The design of service system***

The design of service system of County Family Service Center of Foreign Brides is mainly based on the experience of the domestic violence service model. This model focuses more on the pathology and treatment instead of the empowering the capacity and raising the consciousness of marriage brides. Further, although the design of service system follows the service system for domestic violence, it is unfriendly to migrant

women when they encounter difficulties in marriage, such as domestic violence or economic problems. The immigrant women usually face numerous barriers in accessing the needed social services and supports, even with the help from the social workers in the center, since the local government social service system and County Family Service Center of Foreign Brides are divided and run by different units. It is important to determine how to integrate these two systems and make the fragmented service system a more supportive entity.

### ***Individual Social Worker***

The professionals involved in providing service and the ideology they hold toward marriage migrants is important for the immigration services. However, since immigration social work is a new field, only a few schools provide immigrant related social work courses. Therefore, most social workers involved in immigration social work are not equipped with multi-cultural and related knowledge on marriage migrants. The disciplines of cultural sensitivity, anti-oppression social work knowledge and practical experience with multi-cultural social work are a work-in-progress and therefore are unfamiliar to social workers who must address these issues.

### **(5) Conclusion: What subjectivity should social worker perform, state body or helping body?**

Social work has become the primary instrument to provide immigration service in this increasingly diverse global society in Taiwan, Province of China and social work professionals have an ethical obligation to continuously examine their understanding of the roles in this new practical field. The author argues that since the assumptions of immigrant integration that underlie social work related policies and regulations, and as an extension, the social work services per se and the service delivery systems for marriage immigrants require further investigation and integration. Besides, heritage from its legacy, social workers have a professional obligation to work against oppressive conditions for their clients, providing a bridge between marriage migrants and the state which usually has the power over those being oppressed in society which becomes a critical issue for us to ponder on. Working within this evolving but government-dominated practice field, forces the social workers into the dual role: an agent of the state that provides help and support within the tight-knit nexus woven by

present immigration policies, national security policy, social work intervention system, service delivery system designation, and stand by the oppressed group of marriage migrants in this foreign country. This dual and contradictory role bring a political moral decision to individual social worker in the field, to be a state body providing enculturation programs to marriage migrants or to practice a helping body to work with marriage migrants and to gain their subject agency in this multicultural society with gender and class consciousness. Therefore, the author considers that Taiwan, Province of China social workers as an agency in this newly globalized society need to regain their commitment to the oppressed people under this historical torrent caused by globalization and professionalization and revival their libratory role which already demonstrated in pioneers' daily practice.

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## 6. Conclusion

*Reiko Ogawa, Frank Tsen-Yung Wang, Hsiao Chun Liu and Eun-Shil Kim*

In East Asia, the normative gender order of industrial society with a male bread winner model and a female housewife is no longer tenable, as both the labor market and families are going under an unprecedented level of transformation. In the post-industrial East Asian society, new forms of families and a new labor market are emerging, but we are yet to see a new form of welfare state. Numerous studies have shown that the social policies are fundamental in setting the parameters for care provision, and the present social policy can no longer be confined within the framework of the nation state. The research presented here does not aim to compare the social policy of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, Province of China *per se*, but rather tries to understand and analyze how the immigration policy and institutions shape the experience of migrant care workers who are increasingly becoming engaged in reproductive work in East Asia.

Encountered with a similar demographic challenges presented by a low fertility rate and an aging society, the three countries in East Asia (Japan, Korea and Taiwan, Province of China) are trying to cope with a common care deficit crises. When the care work shifted from private unpaid work to a paid service purchased in the market, we need to consider how the market has been opened, to whom, and why. The importation of migrants seems to become one of the easy solutions to resolve the care deficit, but this has occurred in different ways according to the socio-economic and geopolitical situation of each country. The economic investment of Taiwan, Province of China and Japan to Southeast Asia propelled the entry of migrants engaging in reproductive work, while Korea predominantly utilizes the labor reserve of Koreans in China along the same ethnic line. Aside from the migrant care workers, marriage migrants are increasingly becoming a source of reproductive labor, helping to ameliorate both the decreasing capacity of the family and the depopulation of the entire nation. This research is situated at the historical juncture of the collapse of the old model, and the emergence of a new model of a welfare state, and addresses the reconfiguration of the care regime, which is highly contested.

Instead of summarizing the previous chapters, we would like to present several points which surfaced during our research that might be useful for future research and discussion. First, comparing the ways in which migrant women are introduced to undertake care work largely differs between Japan and Taiwan, Province of China.

Frank Tsen-Yung Wang's Chapter 3 demonstrates that the migratory regime in Taiwan, Province of China is dominated by the market through private brokers who mediate between the families in the host country and the migrant workers in the sending countries. The space of caregiving is largely private and informal, and the cost for migration is shouldered by the migrant and the employers. Care is situated in the private sphere through the powerful rendering of the three generation family ideology, justifying the minimum involvement of the state in providing the care. The migratory flow is dominated by the logic of the market, which does not always assure the human rights of the migrants. In addition, the migrant workers are situated at the bottom of the care market as affordable and flexible labor. Regarding their incorporation into the care regime, migrant workers are 'guest workers' who cannot stay longer than 9 years, and belong to a different care system from the local caregivers.

In contrast, Japan's migration of caregivers under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is a state-lead and state-sponsored migration of care workers as examined in Reiko Ogawa's Chapter 2. The governmental institutions in both the sending and receiving countries are heavily involved in the recruitment, matching, deployment and training of the migrants. The government and host institutions have shouldered the cost of migration, including six months Japanese language training. In fact, the cost to train one Indonesian or Filipino caregiver exceeds the annual salary of a Japanese caregiver, so the migrant care workers are not cheap labors. Also, it has been defined by the EPA that the migrants can work only in institutions (hospitals and nursing homes), and not in private households. The working conditions of the migrants, including their salaries and benefits, are the same as their Japanese co-workers, and they are covered by the labor standard law in Japan. Although the migration of care workers in Japan came under the provision to promote free trade, the conditions in which they are introduced goes against the global trend governed by neo-liberal ideologies to see migrant workers as 'cheap,' 'flexible' and 'informal' labors. Instead, migrant care workers under the EPA are 'expensive,' 'un-flexible' and 'formal' because they are expected to pass the national board examination within a limited period of time, so the employers are responsible for supporting their studies. The condition to pass the national examination in Japanese within a limited period of time is considered to be extremely difficult, but at the same time it provides an opportunity for the migrants to be incorporated into the single long-term care system of Japan. At this point in time<sup>1</sup>, it serves as a social experiment in introducing the migrants into the intimate space of care

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<sup>1</sup> The first cohort of Indonesian nurse candidates who arrived in August 2008 has taken the national board examination in early 2009. Due to language difficulties, all the candidates failed but in 2010, two Indonesians and one Filipina have passed.

which the Japanese society has hardly ever experienced before. The favorable response towards the migrant care workers in general reflects the anxieties of the aging society where the public is profoundly concerned about the deteriorating pension system and the lack of human resources who can provide elderly care.

Table 1: Comparison in the migration of care workers to Japan and Taiwan, Province of China

	Japan	Taiwan, Province of China
Driving force in shaping policy	Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and Japanese Nursing Association	International diplomatic isolation; Profit in the broker market
Professional level of workers	Professional nurse and para-professional care givers	Para-professional care workers
Sites of work	Institutions (hospitals and nursing homes)	Mainly private homes and institution (nursing homes)
Sending countries	Indonesia and the Philippines	Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines
Requirement	National nurse/caregiver exam in Japanese in three/four years	none
Way of introducing workers to employers	Government to Government	Market (brokers)
Status of migrant workers	Guest worker until they pass the national examination	Guest worker (max. nine years)
Salary	Same salary as Japanese nurse assistants/home helpers	Minimum wage
Relationship with Long Term Care (LTC) Policies	Integrated with LTC once they pass the national exam	Separate from LTC
Year of migrant care worker policy implementation	2008	1992

Source: Created by the authors

Migration of care workers in Taiwan, Province of China and Japan represents two extreme cases; one being market-dominated and the other being state-dominated, neither of which seems to be sustainable in the long run. The former raises concerns about the human rights of the migrants, and the latter is too costly for the state to shoulder all of the expenses of migration. Hollifield (1992) points out the tension between the state and the market regarding migration. He states that classical liberalism has two precepts: the notion that the market functions most smoothly in the absence of constraining regulations, and the notion that labor is a commodity to be bought and sold in the market. However, in the case of migration, even the most liberal states seek to control immigration as it is the essence of state sovereignty. This contradictory logic between the state and the market in viewing the economic and political dimension of migration is called the 'liberal paradox.' In the case of Taiwan, Province of China, the market-dominated model maximizes the economic dimension of migration, and the political dimension is likely to be resolved by confining the migrants to a guest worker status. In the case of Japan, the state-dominated model minimizes the economic dimension, but controls the political dimension through a quota system and imposition of the national examination.

Considering the liberal paradox between the state and the market, Korea serves as a unique model. Eun-Shil Kim (Chapter 4) elaborates that Korea utilizes the labor reserve of Korean-Chinese women to undertake care work through a special visa arrangement that privileges subjects of the same ethnicity. The migrant women who speak the language and are familiar with the culture are performing care work both in institutions and private homes. The salary and the working conditions are equal to the locals, but since the domestic work are not covered by the labor laws, they are in an unstable position. The economic dimension in Korea has been taken care of by the market, and the migrants are free to choose their employers. The political dimension does not seem to bring much tension, as the migrants are of the same ethnicity as the locals.

However, this strategy cannot be applied in universal contexts. For example, Japan has also allowed overseas Japanese descendents to enter into the job market since 1990, much in the same way as the Korean-Chinese. But unlike the Koreans, who maintained their language and culture in China, the Japanese descendents in Latin America or elsewhere did not maintain their language skills. Since most of them could not speak the language, the majority is engaged in 3D (dirty, difficult and dangerous) production work and not in the reproduction or personal services industries. Both Korea and Japan succeeded in expanding the labor market by incorporating the diaspora community, but language and culture served as a marker to divide the job market of production and reproduction work. Further research is required to identify the role of the state and the

market in shaping the immigration policy as well as the care provisions.

Second, we need to reflect on the distribution of care work at the global scale. As stated in Eun-Shil Kim's Chapter, only the elderly are left in Yanbian, China, where the Korean-Chinese originated, and everyone who can work has left for Korea and other areas including Japan and big cities in China where they can earn a better living. The question then arises that when the Korean-Chinese are taking care of the Korean elderly in Korea, who will take care of the Korean-Chinese elderly in China? Similarly, the migration of care workers from Southeast Asia under the EPA is considered to be a 'brain drain' because the Indonesian/Filipino nurses and caregivers can only work as nurse/caregiver assistants until they pass the national examination. Since mutual recognition of the certificate is not taking place between Japan and Southeast Asia, it is considered 'de-skilling' for a registered nurse from Southeast Asia to work as a nurse assistant in Japan.

The extraction of care resources from the poorer countries cause a fundamental problem because the care crises in poorer countries may be manifested in a different way, and yet is inter-connected to the care crises in rich countries. While the countries in East Asia may have the luxury to have care being provided by the state, market and/or the family, the poorer countries may not have any of these resources, resulting in deteriorating health conditions. Moreover, the poorer countries are losing their human resources, which often include those who were trained under the national budget. In the case of nurse migration, several models of 'brain circulation' are taking place<sup>2</sup> and we need to learn from the 'good practices' to ensure the fair distribution of care at the global level.

One alternative to extracting care resources from poorer countries is to look into the gender order in the host country. Fraser (2006) suggests the need for a new model of the gender division of labor. She argues that the male-headed households with stable employment which can provide the full social security are no longer possible in the post-industrial society. In order to cope with these changes, two solutions have been conceived which may satisfy the feminists. First is the 'universal bread winner model' where both men and women work and care is purchased in the market. But when the care work is shifted to the market, what we have learned and demonstrated in our study is that care work is poorly remunerated, not only in East Asia, but also elsewhere. As a consequence, care work becomes feminized and racialised unless the value of care work is socially upgraded.

<sup>2</sup> Marilyn Lorenzo, 2010, "Philippine Nursing Development Gains Towards Greater Competitiveness", Paper presented at International Conference on Transnational Care Workers from Southeast Asia to Japan: Dialogue between Policymakers and Scholars, Kyushu University Asia Center, 27 February, 2010.

The second model Fraser suggests is a 'caregiver parity model' where men remain as bread winners and women receive compensation for care work. In order for this model to be successful, the level of compensation for child raising, housekeeping and elderly care has to be sufficient enough to meet the full-time rate of employment. However, this still sees care work as 'women's work,' institutionalizing gender differences. Moreover, considering the high level of public expenditure, this model may remain as a utopian ideal. Demonstrating the shortcomings of both models, the third option Fraser suggests is the 'universal caregiver model' which proposes that men need to become like women, combining breadwinning and caregiving. The employment arrangements have to be made in a way to suit the care requirements which are the norms for women's part-time employment today. This model transcends the dichotomy between the breadwinner and caregiver roles and requires the restructuring of the existing gender order ensuring gender equity.

From our research, as well as Fraser's model, two propositions arise that underpin the migration of Southeast Asian women to East Asia:

- 1) The migration of women from Southeast Asia and China is inter-connected with the care deficit in East Asia
- 2) Aside from the economic inequality between East and Southeast Asia, gender order in the host society is related to the influx of migrant women in East Asia

Then, the question for future inquiry is: what is an ideal solution for allocating care work which ensures fairness and equity in terms of race, class and gender both at the global and local level?

Third, in Taiwan, Province of China and Korea, marriage migrants are at the center of the immigration policy. Unlike 'guest workers,' they are likely to permanently reside and become wives, mothers and daughter-in-laws of the nationals. The policies towards marriage migrants are increasingly geared towards 'integration' as they are expected to solve the problems related to the decreasing population and disintegration of the family. Although both Taiwan, Province of China and Korea have established nationwide network of support centers for the marriage migrants, the difficulty in enforcing the idea and practice of 'multi-culturalism' is discussed in both Eun-Shil Kim's and Hsiao Chun Liu's Chapters (4 and 5). In both cases, instead of accepting the diverse cultural backgrounds of the foreign brides and empowering them as citizens, the support system tends to orient them towards 'assimilation' and 'docility.' Moreover, the political discourse on 'multi-culturalism' which emphasizes the full membership of marriage migrants within the family and the

nation conceals the structure in which they are enforced to undertake unpaid care work. The seemingly natural conjunction between the marriage migrants and the concept of 'multi-culturalism' has to be examined within the context of care crises in East Asia. Japan also stands as the 'oldest liberal democracy in Asia,' but the minorities are at the margins of society, and do not gain acknowledgement and respect towards their distinct way of life (Lam, 2005:223).

The internationalization of 'multi-culturalism' is an important aspect of the globalization processes which rapidly diffused in two significant ways (Kymlicka, 2005). First, the discourse on 'multi-culturalism' has been circulated among the elite in the international circle of policy makers, activists and scholars, which created principles of tolerance and ideals of justice. Second, international standards of minority rights, including immigrant rights, have been adapted by international organizations such as the United Nations, International Labour Organization and World Bank, which have attempted to codify minimum standards for the states in dealing with the minorities, and have established mechanisms to monitor state compliance with these standards. Under the development of international norms, it is no longer possible for states to treat minorities as purely a 'domestic' matter that has nothing to do with the international community.

In East Asia, the rhetoric of 'multi-culturalism' can be seen as an import from the West, and it may not suit the specific historical, cultural and geopolitical circumstances of the region (He and Kymlicka, 2005). At the same time, there is a growing interest in East Asia in exploring and expanding liberal democracy and emerging models for multi-culturalism. The democratization processes which have taken place in Taiwan, Province of China and Korea since the 1980s and 90s provided an environment for the civil society groups, including the migrants, to assert their own rights and increase access to political mobilization. Today, the three countries have already adopted 'multi-culturalism' or the 'multi-cultural society' as an official discourse accommodating the minorities within the nation-state. However, we are still in the process of engaging, examining, defining and conceptualizing what 'multi-culturalism' really means in our society, both theoretically and empirically.

One significant characteristic that distinguishes the discussion on 'multi-culturalism' in East Asia from the West is the geopolitical security issue which continues to haunt the movement of people, as well as their social integration. The political tension within East Asia has been casted upon the individual migrants from a particular country to be suspected of any unrest or insurgency, and the state fears that the migrants will collaborate with the neighboring countries and become a potential aggressor. In the West, the fear of a neighboring enemy invading has disappeared, and with the strengthening of liberal democratic institutions, accommodation of diversity became a



normative practice. However, in the case of East Asia, the security issue applies to marriage migrants from China to Taiwan, Province of China, or North Koreans in Japan and Korea, and hinders the development of 'multi-culturalism'. The vision for East Asian Community has been discussed from time to time but the concrete step towards regional integration in East Asia remains vague. Unlike EU or ASEAN, the lack of regional platform to discuss and construct human rights mechanism in East Asia lie as a future challenge to ensure the fair and just treatment of the migrants and citizens alike.

This collaborative research has raised more questions than suggesting solutions to the issues revolving around migration of Southeast Asian women to East Asia in the field of reproductive work. Nevertheless, we believe that the four chapters presented by researchers from the three countries provided empirical data on the complex process of globalization, which entails the transformation of our societies that we are born in and in which we live our day-to-day lives. The research examined different ways in which the state is responding to the deepening process of globalization and the care deficit, where care work has been shifted from the domestic sphere to the transnational sphere, and reconfiguration of care regime has been taking place. However, this globalization of care proposes profound questions which are yet to be answered: how can we conceptualize care in the 21 century in a way that will ensure fair and equal distribution of care across the globe? How can we develop a caring community which will do justice to both the nationals and the migrants? What kinds of social justice make sense in this increasingly globalized world?

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